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... SHALL THE BALANCE. SHEET BE BALANCED? 
((And the reasons for mourning in Denmark are the same 
as they are in 'Ohio) 
A nd the cost is not figured in krone any more than it's 
measured in dollars. 
~hey are) of course) the lesser entries in the book: 
The amputated leg and the artificial eye have cost some-
body something: 
And the broken mind cannot be repaired by a pocketful 
of cash. Oh) no) no. 
The quality of torture is never listed on the curb) 
Nor the rate of grief computed on delicate scales.. " 
u • •• Shall the balance sheet be balanced? 
By whom? How? 
No combination of savants and learned cogs) holes punched 
in ca~ds and electric motors) 
. . 
No brow containing Euclid) not even the serenest lores ' 
in consultation with each other) . 
Could be else than baffled by the simplest problem of the 
cost of hunger in a baby's bones." 
-From ON A NOTE OF TRIUMPH 
By NORMAN CORWIN 
WHAT RUSSIA DID FOR 
VICTORY 
By SERGEI KOURNAKOFF 
N ·ORMAN CORWIN is absolutely right. Right and dis-couraging. Discouraging to the one who, like myself, 
has set himself the task to be the "learned cog" which will 
attempt to compute, albeit in the most general way, the 
military effort of the Soviet people and their armed forces. 
The military effort of a people, especially a people who has 
felt the boot of the enemy on their soil, whose cities and 
villages have been transformed into little more than charred 
spots on the -landscape and cherished memories on maps, 
whose sons and daughters have been killed and tortured, 
limbs cut off, minds set wandering-cannot be measured only 
in dollars, tons, miles and days. 
The mourning of the wife or mother in Ohio, tear for tear, 
is the equivalent of the mourning of the wife or mother in 
Smolensk. But somehow mourning is more bearable when 
th~ boy's room in the family nest is intact, when other mem-
bers of the family are alive and well. Mourning the dead on 
a charred beam lying in melting snow in a place that was a 
village-is somehow less bearable. And then there is another 
thing, a thing which means little to the individual mourner, 
centered in his own grief, but which is important in the life 
of a nation or country: the number of mourning mothers and 
wives. While "holes punched in cards" cannot measure the 
grief of the individual, they can and must record the numbers. 
Nothing expressed in tons,. miles, days and dollars can give 
the whole picture of a country's war effort, for sobs, spasms, 
pangs will be left uncounted, but the relative effort of each 
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country which took part in the anti-Hitler coalition can be 
expressed only in dry figures. 
Expressing this relative~ comparative effort is important. 
Not for the sake of glory and self-satisfaction, but for the sake 
of the soundness of the structure of peace which is being built 
now. The "engineers" who are doing the building must know 
the relative strength of the stones they are using for the arch 
of security, lest they use limestone for a key and shove the 
granite into a remote corner where it will be wasted. 
The "test by steel and fire, the trial by war provides the 
"engineers" with convincing data on the strength of the 
material at hand, for the stubborn facts of the battlefield 
cannot be faked. The dice of total war cannot be loaded. 
The truth comes out in the wash for all to see. However, in 
almost every country on five-sixths of the earth there are 
people who do not wish to see any social changes take place 
because they have a stake in the social status quo ~ people who 
by the same token do not wish a new society to succeed and 
who, therefore, try to obscure the vision of the people by 
belittling the astounding achievements of a truly planned 
society in this war. There are also those who have been 
beaten and who do not wish to acknowledge that they have 
been beaten to a great extent by a social system they hated 
most and swore to wipe off the face of the earth. Finally, 
there are those who simply want to flatter their national 
ego by strutting around, beating their chests and clamoring: 
"WE did it all." 
The first category are the reactio.naries~ fascists~ semi-fascists 
and para-fascists everywhere; the second are the Nazis; the 
third are not quite as dangerous (because they are primitive 
and naive)-the nationalists and chauvinists~ the "we firsters" 
of many colors and flags. All these groups have one common 
political denominator-anti-Sovietism~ mixed in some cases 
(as in the case of some British Tories), with long standing 
russophobia. 
The anti-Soviet propaganda of these people has become 
crystallized in half a dozen basic slogans (which are being 
used with certain variations). 
6 
Here are these catch phrases: 
The Imperial Russian Army in the First World War did 
better than the Red A rmy in the Second World War. The 
Tsar's soldiers retreated only to the marshes of the Polessye 
while the Red soldiers were pressed back to the Volga and 
the Terek. Ergo-the Imperial Army was better and the 
Tsarist system was better. 
• 
The Red Army WO,n. because it had space and climate on 
its side. 
• • • 
The Red Army won because the Allied Air Forces bombed 
Germany into submission. 
-
The Red Army won because it got its weapons through 
lend-lease. 
• 
The Red Army won because of the traditional Hfa.talistic" 
heroism of the Russian people who fought in spite of the 
Soviet regime7 the communist leadership7 etc. 
T he Red Army in fact did not win at all because it was 
the battle of Britain which saved the world. (Another variant 
is-EI Elamein was the real turning point of the war; or, 
St. Lo was Germany's Waterloo.) 
Every thinking person understands the hollowness of these 
catch phrases, as well as their purpose (the purpose becomes 
clear when one notes that every Nazi general and bigwig 
who hastily fled westward in the corridor between the Oder 
and the Elbe, in April 1945, uses them), but the thinking 
non-military person must have the facts marshalled in order 
to puncture the hollow catch phrases with the pin of logic. 
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Many 9f the facts are not known yet. Many figures are 
incomplete at this time. But out of the great adding machine 
of the Second World War enough figures have emerged to 
see what's what. 
I will try to present here the basic facts and figures per-
taining to the effort of the Soviet Union in this war. For 
the sake of simplicity and to aid the memory of the reader, 
most data will be given in round figures. Let us add that this 
pamphlet is not an effort to show that the Soviet Union won 
the war alone. Most Soviet war leaders headed by Generalis-
simo Stalin have said that victory is a result of a common 
effort. In this effort the leading United Nations chipped in 
with their best. What I hope to demonstrate conclusively is 
that the Soviet effort was decisive and that Soviet power~ in 
all its manifestations~ played a decisive role i,n, that effort. 
World War I and World War n 
Russia entered the First World War as a full-fledged mili-
tary partner of France and England. In spite of certain dif-
ferences between the social-political internal set-ups of Eng-
land and France on one hand, and Tsarist Russia on the 
other, they were bound together by common imperialistic 
interests, . interests which were being threatened by German 
imperialism. The latter, having embarked on an aggressive 
international policy at the end of the nineteenth century, 
intended to crush England and France and at least greatly 
weak~n Russia by stripping her of the Ukraine, Poland, the 
Baltic countries and Finland. 
Community of interests brought about the formation of the 
Entente. The latter was formed in stages: the Franco-Russian 
alliance dated from 1891, the Franco-British alliance from 
1904, and the R usso-Bri tish understanding from 1907 . Thus, 
when the war broke out in 1914, Russia had been in the 
so-called "western family" for seven years. Russia was not in 
the least isolated, either politically or psychologically. 
The international position of the Soviet Union on the eve 
of World War II was diametrically opposite. The "latent war" 
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of European reaction against the U.S.S.R. had flared and 
smouldered intermittently between 1917 and 1941. In 1938 
the Munich Pact, so often conveniently forgotten, had in fact 
cemented a pan-European coalition against the Soviet Union, 
including even the latter's ex-ally of 1935-France.'· The Soviet 
Union was literally alone. She did not even have her pro-
verbial "only friend"-Montenegro-on her side. The imperial 
interests of the Anglo-French bloc and of the German bloc 
united them in their hatred of the socialist state. 
The First World War had smouldered for years. The sides 
were lined up. There was no strategic surprise. There was 
no tactical surprise, because the assassination of Archduke 
Franz-Ferdinand had given all concerned more than a month's 
warning. On the other hand, Hitler's attack on the Soviet 
Union, coming as it did in violation of a pact of non-aggres-
sion, without the slightest warning, achieved the initial tacti-
cal surprise so essential to the success of a lightning war. 
Imperial Russia met Germany in 1914 on a frontier which 
had existed for generations, with a borderland fully fortified. 
The Soviet border of 1941 was of recent formation and had 
not been fully prepared for defense yet (although the extra 
strip of fighting space, some 175 ' miles wide, in Western 
Belorussia, the Western Ukraine, in the Baltic and in Bessa-
rabia did play the salutary role of buffer. Even so, however, in 
1914 the distance between the German border and Moscow, 
along the central Berlin-Moscow direction, was some 900 miles, 
while in 1941 it was only 650 miles. 
On the flanks of the huge front, Russia's position in 1914 
was incomparably more secure. In 1914, the nearest enemy 
to St. Petersburg was in East Prussia, 500 miles away. In 1941 
the enemy was in Finland, only 100 miles away and would 
have been only 18 miles away had it not been for the pre-
ventive war against Finland, in 1939-1940. 
In 1914 the nearest enemy was 250 miles from Odessa (in 
Hungary). In 1941 the enemy was only 120 miles away (in 
Rumania). 
In 1914 Murmansk was absolutely safe (except for enemy 
submarines). In 1914, thanks to "dear little" Finland and the 
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occupation of Norway by the enemy, this only Soviet outlet 
to the West was under direct and severe attack. 
In 1914 Japan was an ally of the Entente and Russia was 
able to move practically all her troops from the Far East to 
fight the Germans. This writer remembers witnessing the 
arrival of Far Eastern divisions in Poland after a train trip of 
ten weeks (in October, 1914). Japan supplied weapons and 
munitions to Russia. In 1941 the Soviet Union was compelled 
to keep a great army in the Far East because half of the Japa-
nese army remained concentrated on the horseshoe border 
of Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. Of course, this time Japan 
did not give the Soviet Union as much as a rifle cartridge. 
While during World War I Turkey was fighting Russia, 
and while it remained outwardly neutral during World War 
II, the U.S.S.R. still had to keep troops on the Turkish border 
in 1941-45 because of the suspicious character of that neu-
trality. 
The Central Powers in 1914 were considerably less strong 
than Hitler's Germany was in 1941, with almost all of Europe 
at her beck and call. All you have to do is compare the Ger-
many-Austria-Hungary-Bulgaria-Turkey bloc with the Ger-
many-Italy, Austria-Hungary-Rumania-Finland-Bulgaria-Slo-
vakia-Croatia bloc, de facto allied with Spain, and controlling 
all the rest of continental Europe with its resources, produc-
tive capacity and millions of slave labor. Furthermore, in 1914 
Germany was squeezed between two fronts right from the 
start, while up to June, 1944, Germany's control reached 
to the Atlantic Ocean with all that implies strategically. 
And this brings us to the most important difference between 
Russia's strategic position in World War I and World War II. 
The difference can be told in a very few words and with a 
handful of figures. 
During the entire World War I a Western Front existed, 
and it was a "first front," not a "second front" in importance. 
But during three of the four years of World War II the Soviet . 
Union fought Germany and German-controlled Europe alone. 
Let us look at the deployment of forces on both fronts in 
1914. This initial deployment gives a measures of the situation 
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which obtained throughout the whole course of that war 
(with only temporary changes). -
The forces deployed in the initial stage of the war were as 
follows: 
Allies 
Western Front 85 Inf. Div. (Fr. & Br.) 
12 Cav. Div. (Fr. & Br.) 
Eastern Front 52'l'2 Inf. Div. (Russian) 
21 Cav. Div. (Russian) 
Central Powers 
86 Inf. Div. (German) 
10 Cav. Div. (German) 
17 Inf. Div. (German) 
1 Cav. Div. (German) 
35 Inf. Div. (Austro.-H.) 
11 Cav. Div. (Austr.-H.) 
It must be noted that the fire power of an Austro-Hungarian 
division was rated at about half of the power of a German 
division. Thus at the outset the Russian Army faced about the 
equivalent of 35 German Infantry and 12 Cavalry divisions 
while the French, Belgian and British faced S6 German In-
fantry and 10 Cavalry divisions. This, of course, was due to 
the so-called Schlieffen Plan according to which the Germans 
intended to crush France first and then turn on Russia. 
The greatest German concentration in the East was effected 
in the campaign of 1915, but even then the Russian Army 
never faced more than half of the Central Powers' effectives. 
At the end of the war when Russia was practically out, the 
Germans kept 20 per cent of their divisions in the East and 
So per cent in the West. 
Thus, barring the time when Russia was temporarily 
eclipsed as a military power, the Russian Imperial Army had 
to face between 30 and 50 per cent of the enemy divisions. 
The Eastern Front, barring its meanderings, was roughly 
1,000 miles long from the Bal tic to the Black Sea. The deepest 
enemy penetration (before 1915 when the Germans occupied 
the Ukraine and reached Rostov) was about 300 miles in the 
center. 
The Russian Imperial Army won only one campaign. That 
was the Brussilov offensive in the summer of 1916. Even then, 
the operation, brilliantly successful, was robbed of real 
strategic results by the inept leadership of the Russian Su-
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-
preme Command (nominally under the Tsar) which did not 
support General Brussilov's effort. The Russian Army won 
a number of tactical successes, some of them of great scope 
(such as the early Galician operation), but the war as a whole 
can be called a series of failures, some of them pre-eminently 
heroic (such as the invasion of East Prussia to save the Allies 
at the Marne). The result leaves no doubt: Russia was de-
feated and knocked out of the war. It must be added here 
that, contrary to popular opinion, the Russia revolution was 
hastened by military defeat, and not military defeat caused 
by the revolution. 
The Allies lost 9,300,000 killed, missing and prisoners dur-
ing World War I; of these Russia lost 4,200,000 (we do not 
count the wounded which were 12,800,000 and 5,000,000 re-
spectively). Thus Russia lost less than half of what the other 
Allies did. This happened because the Russian Army through-
out the war faced less enemies than her A llies did. 
Let us add to this that Space, Mud and Traditional Russian 
Heroism were as much on the side of Russia in 1914-18 as they 
were in 1941-45, with all other strategic and political factors 
in her favor as compared to the U.S.S.R. And still Russia lost 
World War I and the U.S.S.R. wo.n World War II. 
We have compared in this chapter the initial political and 
strategic factors which shaped the course of World War I as 
far as Russia was concerned. We also mentioned the basic 
military facts and figures pertaining to Russia in World War I. 
The basic military facts concerning the U.S.S.R. in World 
War II will be the theme of the next chapter because they 
are too tremendous in scope to fit into a point-by-point com-
parison with the facts of World War I. 
Highlights of the Soviet-German War 
The Soviet-German War lasted 1,416 days and raged over 
a theater of approximately 1,250,000 square miles. 
The German-Soviet front was never shorter than the dis-
tance between the shores of the Barents Sea and the Black 
Sea (except in the final stage when Finland was knocked out 
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and the front stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea) . This 
distance, as the crow flies is 1,700 miles. It was the distance 
between the Soviet right-flank sentry on Cape Rybachi near 
Murmansk, and the leIt-flank sentry on Cape Khersonese, 
near Sevastopol. 
In the late summer of 1942, when the front bulged eastward 
to touch Stalingrad and Grozny and the Soviet flank sentries 
stood on Cape Rybachi and on the ruins of the cement factory 
at Novorossisk, the front was roughly 2,700 miles long. 
The line of the front did not budge in the extreme north; 
it swung 650 miles in the center, from Brest-Litovsk to Vo-
ronezh; it swung 1,000 miles in the south, from Przemysl in 
Galicia to Stalingrad on the Volga. 
In this tremendous fighting space the Germans kept an 
average of 240 divisions fighting. 
A rough comparison of the "volume of fighting" in the 
East and in the West would run something like this: 
East-240 enemy divisions engaged during 47 months-
11,280 mos/div.:if: 
West-70 enemy divisions engaged (France, Germany) dur-
ing 11 months, plus 20 divisions (Africa, Italy) engaged 
during 36 months, plus 110 enemy divisions (Low Countries, 
France, 1940) engaged during lY2 months-l,655 mos/div. 
Allowing for small or short-lived action like the "sitzkrieg" 
in 1939-40, Poland, Norway, Greece, East Africa, etc., it can 
be said that the rough ratio between the "volume of fighting" 
(expressed in "division-per-month" units) done by the West-
ern Allies and by the Soviet Union is 7:45, or about 1 :6Y2). 
This ratio is also borne out by the respective Allied casual-
ties in the war against Germany. They run like this: 
British Empire and U. S. killed, missing and prisoners: 
Soviet Union, killed, missing and prisoners: . 
(estimated, see chapter on COST, p. 31) 
• Mos/div. equals one division fighting one month. 
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1,100,000 
Finally, if we compare the areas over which active land 
operations were conducted, we see roughly the following: 
The Red Army fought over 750,000 square miles of territory 
when retreating eastward and over the same 75°,000 square 
miles when advancing westward. In addition it fought over 
roughly 500,000 square miles of foreign lands (between April, 
1944, and May, 1945). This is a total of about 2,000,000 square 
miles of fighting space. 
The Anglo--American (and smaller Allied) armies in Eu-
rope and North Africa fought over an area of about 350,000 
square miles (not counting the fighting of Polish troops in 
1939 and the fighting of the French Army in 1940, but count-
ing the marching and counter-marching of the British in the 
Libyan coastwise corridor) . 
All these calculations may seem to some rathe~ mechanical. 
However, the fact that the three basic ratios-of volume of 
fighting expressed in duration of fighting and the number of 
enemy troops engaged, of area of figliting, and of losses in-
curred-all point to an over-all ratio of effort expressed in the 
symbol 1 :6-shows that this ratio does express the true pic-
ture. The Soviet Union did roughly eighty-five per cent of 
the fighting against Germany and her satellites. 
Having established the approximate figures pertaining to 
the width and length of the space within which so many Red 
Army men fought and gave their lives, let us examine the 
course of the war. 
This course from the viewpoint of higher strategy can be 
divided into four. periods: the first period lasted seven months, 
between the initial German attack and the end of the Battle 
of Moscow; the second lasted a year between the Battle of 
Moscow and the end of the Battle of Stalingrad; the third 
lasted six months between the Battle of Stalingrad and the 
end of the Battle of Kursk (t~e so-called Kursk Arc); the 
fourth lasted 21 months between the Battle of Kursk and 
the end of the final Battle of Berlin. 
Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk are three strategic turning 
points of the war. Berlin is the pay-off. 
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THE FIRST PERIOD 
Germany attacked the Soviet Union with close to 200 divi-
sions, of which 175 were "pure German." No other Ger-
man troops were engaged anywhere except for the skirmishing 
in Libya by the British against three German division~ and 
a depleted Italian expeditionary force. British troops had 
pulled out of Greece in May. America was still ,virtually un-
armed. Britain was slowly recO'yering from the so-called 
Battle of Britain. All Europe, with its 320,000,000 people 
and a yearly production of 50,000,000 tons of steel, was Hit-
ler's. The German Army could face eastward without hav-
ing to look over its shoulder. World public opinion on June 
21, 1941, was still babbling about "Communazism"; the So-
viet Union was politically and militarily isolated. 
The German High Command set itself the following strate-
gic goal· (or objective): to destroy the Red Army within 
three months and to force the U.S.S.R. to capitulate before 
winter, 1941. 
Territorially, the objective was: the capture of the Lenin-
grad-Moscow-Kharkov-Rostov line, thus bringing about the 
utter paraylsis of the Soviet transportation system. 
The Red Army was to be destroyed west of that line, thus 
making it unnecessary for the German Army to extend its 
communications beyond the 60o-mile mark (Brest-Litovsk-
Moscow). 
The attainment of that goal would have also cut the Mur-
mansk route, made the Iranian route virtually impracticable, 
destroyed the Soviet Baltic Fleet, bottled up the Northern 
Fleet and made the Black Sea Fleet almost useless by depriving 
it of its main bases (at least, so the Germans thought). 
Furthermore, the Soviet Union, deprived of 30 per cent 
of her population, of half of her food producing area, 40 
• The term "strategic goal," which will recur frequently in the forth-
coming exposition, can be defined thus: the objective of a war, or military 
campaign, set by the High Command, the attainment of which must bring 
decisive results. 
per cent of her coal, half of her steel and iron, was not ex-
pected by the Germans to be able to continue its resistance. 
The 200-odd German divisions plunged forward in ' one 
strategic echelon, blitz-fashion. 
They beleaguered Leningrad, they took Kharkov, they cap-
tured Rostov (holding it for only a few days before being 
ejected), they reached the outskirts of Moscow. 
Vast as the enemy armies attacking Leningrad, Kharkov 
and Rostov were, the direction of the main blow lay on the 
Brest-Litovsk-Moscow line. Here the blitz was stopped for the 
first time in September, east of Smolensk and two-thirds of 
the way to the main goal (i.e., Moscow). After that it never 
blitze.d again. It was a decisive delay which threw the Ger-
mans two months off schedule. Instead of opening the Battle 
of Moscow in August the Germans were forced to start it in 
the . beginning of October. 
They concentrated fifty-one divisions, of which 13 were 
armored, for the attack on Moscow. Three quarters of a mil-
lion men, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns and 700 planes attacked a . 
perimeter of 300 miles, forging a pair of pincers aimed at the 
capital. In that battle the Germans had a numerical superior-
ity of 3: 1 in tanks, 2: 1 in planes, better than 2: 1 in guns ana 
1 Y2: 1 in mortars. 
At the eleventh hour the Soviet High , Command, under 
Marshal Stalin, delivered a blow in the north which frustrated 
the German maneuver to cut the Murmansk railroad and be-
siege Leningrad instead of blockading it (which is more than 
a fine point), struck a blow in the south which recaptured 
Rostov and, finally, struck the big blow at the central group-
ing of the German 51 divisions, completely r<?uting them and 
throwing them back as much as 250 miles in some sectors of 
the Moscow front. 
Moscow, Leningrad and Rostov remained in Soviet hands, ' 
the Red Army was not only not destroyed, but on the offen-
sive, Soviet industry by a "miracle" of organization had been 
largely moved from the war theatre hundreds (and more) 
miles to the east . . Part of the population of the occupied ter-
ritory became partisans, another part was evacuated. 
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The German Army had· failed in the attainment of its 
strategic goal. It had failed with its blitz-method. Between 
November 16 and January 1, 1942, i.e., during the Battle of 
Moscow, the Germans had lost 2,200 tanks, 14,000 motor 
vehicles, 2,000 guns and 140,000 killed (which means certainly 
another 400,000 wounded). Fifty of their best divisions were 
shattered to the tune of 50 per cent losses. 
Here are the results of the Battle of Moscow: it made the 
Germans fail of the strategic goal of their decisive campaign; 
it destroyed the legend of German invincibility; it inflicted 
terrible human and material losses on them; it actually killed 
the blitz)· it saved the Soviet Union and thus the United Na-
tions. After the Battle of Moscow, the Germans dared no 
longer thrust directly at the Soviet capital, but advanced in a 
roundabout maneuver, a maneuver which, by the summer of 
1942 , brought them to Stalingrad. 
At the time of the Battle of Moscow the U.S.A.A.F. was not 
in action and the bombing of Europe by the R.A.F. was in 
its infancy. One hundred and fifty ton raids on Hamburg 
were still making headlines. The influence of such bombing 
on the campaign on the Soviet Front was practically nil. As 
to lend-lease, it was nothing more than a signed protocol, and 
a small one at that (one billion dollars-promised, but still 
undelivered) . 
Russian Winter helped because the Red Army was pre-
pared for it (through training, clothing, special oils for mo-
tors, special weapons, special methods of transport) and the 
Germans were not. 
Russian Space helped because it was well defended. Un-
defended space, passive space, does not help. 
What decided the campaign was Soviet organization and 
discipline, military skill, superior military direction and "tra-
ditional" Russian courage with which the people had become 
imbued through education an~ their own experience and 
outlook. 
As far as Germany, back~d by all Europe, and the Soviet 
Union are concerned, the Battle of Moscow was purely a 
"man-to-man" affair, with the rest of the Allied world unable 
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to do much more than cheer. However, out of those cheers 
grew the great war-and-peace alliance of the Big Three. Thus, 
the Battle of Moscow actually won the war and saved hu-
manity. 
THE SECOND PERIOD 
As has been shown above, the first period of the Soviet-Ger-
man war, culminating in the gigantic Battle of Moscow, proved 
to be a German strategic, operational and tactical failure. 
In view of the obvious potential superiority of the anti-Hit-
ler coalition over Germany and her satellites, the Hitler bloc 
stood before ominous perspectives. A ring of land fronts, 
surrounding Germany, was the nightmare of the German High 
Command, which simply had to do something and use to the 
best advantage the time which was being afforded it by the 
unpreparedness of the Western Allies and the lack of strate-
gic coordination between West and East. In the spring of 
1942 nothing outside the Soviet front threatened the Wehr-
macht, because the front in North Africa absorbed only be-
tween 3 and 6 German divisions and half a score Italian 
divisions of doubtful quality. 
The Germans mustered an overwhelming majority of their 
forces and again struck at the Red Army in a desperate new 
attempt to crush the Red Army. The offensive, however, in-
stead of developing between the Baltic and Black Seas as in 
1941, was limited to the southern wing (roughly between Orel 
and the Black Sea). Of the available 256 German divisions 
the German High Command mustered 179 in the East plus 
61 satellite divisions, or 240 in all. A front of 375 miles flared 
up in June, 1942, but only after the Germans had been de-
layed about two months by the epic defense of Sevastopol and 
by Marshal Timoshenko's counterblow in the Izyum-Berven-
kovo sector. 
Again, as in 1941, the Germans planned to advance in blitz-
tempo: July 25-Stalingrad; August 15-Kuybyshev; September 
lo-Arzamas; October-November-the attack on Moscow from 
the east. Note that this time the Germans had to limit their 
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offensive to the southern one-third of the front, that they did 
not dare attack Moscow head-on, but had to pursue a round-
about course and, finally, that their blitz remained on paper. 
They were late at Stalingrad and never reached any of their 
other objectives. 
Aside from the maximum objective (capture of Moscow 
from the rear), the Germans had immediate goals of limited 
strategic importance: they intended to capture the entire 
Donetz industrial region, the wheat of the Don and Kuban, 
the oil of Maikop, Grozny and Baku. They were trying to 
cut the artery of the Volga and thus deprive the U.S.S.R. of 
Caucasian oil and of American materials being shipped via 
Iran up the Caspian and the Volga. 
Stalingrad became the strategic center of gravity of the 
whole campaign, THE objective. It was also destined to be-
come the "zenith" of the war. 
The Germans threw a total of about 60 divisions into the 
Don--Volga Battle. It began in the end of August and lasted 
until the beginning of February. 
It is not our intention to give even the most general de-
scription of this colossal battle about which vqlumes will be 
written. Suffice it to say that the Germans pushed a great 
spearhead to the Volga. This spearhead consisted of 22 of the 
best divisions Hitler had, a total of 330,000 men. When the 
Soviet double concentric pincers closed on November 24, 1942 
(after five days of offensive operations), one-third of a million 
enemy troops were in the bag of a "super-Cannae" from 
which practically none escaped. ("Cannae" is a battle which 
Hannibal won over the Romans in 216 B. C. It is consid~ 
ered a classic of encirclement and annihilation.) The victory 
of Stalingrad was the signal for a series of Soviet offensive op-
erations ranging from Leningrad (where the blockade was 
lifted) to the Sea of Azov. 
Between November 19, 1942, and March 31, 1943, the Red 
Army liberated 185,000 square miles, retook a dozen of the 
most important German-held key strongholds, as well as thou-
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A total of 350,000 enemy soldiers were captured and 850,-
000 killed. Counting the inevitable amount of wounded, it 
may be said in the fall, winter and early spring campaigns 
of 1942-1943 the Red Army destroyed single-handedly an 
enemy army equivalent to the one which invaded the Low-
lands and France in the summer of 1940 and conquered 
Western Europe in six weeks. 
While the Battle of Stalingrad was raging, Allied troops 
landed in North Africa in an unprecedented armada of ships. 
The operation was a masterpiece of planning and execution. 
Far be it from this writer to claim that they should have 
landed in France instead of Africa. Military history will pass 
its verdict on this question when all the data are in. N ever-
theless the fact remains that the Allied landing did not 
threaten the bulk of the German Army. It only put Rommel's 
half dozen German divisions in a trap, forcing them to pull 
out of EI Alamein and speed back to Tunisia where they were 
battered into defeat, although not without a great effort. 
In the fall of 1942 a pair of Axis pincers threatened the 
Middle East. Paulus was moving to the Volga and Rommel 
. was moving to the Nile. However, it must be borne in mind 
that the arms of the pincers were very uneven: Paulus and the 
second strategic echelon backing him up between the Don and 
the Volga had 61 divisions, while Rommel had six Gennan 
divisions and a handful of Italian divisions. 
The Allied campaign in North Africa netted about 150,000 
Axis troops (including probably most of the wounded who 
were captured in the Cap Bon trap). Concurrently, the cam-
paign on the Soviet front netted 1,200,000 killed and captured 
alone. 
The Germans did not achieve any of their strategic objec-
tives and met with an unprecedented military disaster. After 
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Stalingrad the German Army never successfully went on the 
offensive on a strategic scale. 
As an offensive machine the Wehrmacht was through for 
good. Thus, we see that Stalingrad and not EI Alemain was 
the crucial battle of the war. In order to understand this just 
imagine Paulus victorious at Stalingrad with Rommel beaten 
at EI Alemain. The U.S.S.R. (taking the extreme view) goes 
under and the Wehrmacht turns west in the Spring. What 
value would have attached to the Tunisian victory if ~llied 
troops in Africa who had had a difficult time beating six Ger-
man divisions and ten Italian divisions, suddenly had had to 
face in May, 1943, 250 German divisions along the Atlantic 
and Mediterranean "walls"? 
N ow imagine the opposite contingency and you will see 
that even a victorious Rommel could not have done anything 
decisive in Egypt with his handful of men if the Germans still 
had been thrown back from the Volga to the Donetz. . 
Stalingrad without the slightest doubt must be considered 
the hub of the war. 
Let us turn to another aspect of the Stalingrad victory. 
Against the figures we quoted on German materiel captured 
by the Red Army, let us see -how much lend-lease materiel 
had been delivered to the U.S.S.R. at the time of Stalingrad. 
By December 31, 1942, the United States had sent to the 
U.S.S.R.: 2,600 planes; 3,200 tanks; 81,000 trucks (and other 
materials). Britain sent 2,600 tanks and 2,000 planes. It is 
known that the deliveries in November, 1942, were 13 times 
greater than those in January, 1942, On the other hand 
no material received after A ugust could have possibly been 
used by the Russians at Stalingrad. Thus during the crucial 
bade doubtless much less stuff than the above totals was avail-
able to the Red Army. 
As a matter of fact, Leland Stowe's testimony in his recent 
book They Shall Not Sleep is revealing. Mr. Stowe says that 
after early June no more convoys arrived in M urmansk until 
September (the first American train arrived in Teheran from 
the Gulf of Persia with war material for the Red Army only 
in March, 1943). On page 227 Mr. Stowe says: 
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As a matter of fact, Allied materials could not become 
of some decisive quantity in the Soviet Union until the 
end of 1942-after the decision at Stali,ngrad had already 
been settled." (My emphasis-So K.) 
Writing of lend-lease help to the U.S.S.R., Prof. George B. 
Cressey, of the University of Syracuse, says: "It was Rus-
sian planning and Russian equipment which won the victories 
of Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad." (The Basis of Soviet 
Strength, page 247.) 
It is interesting to note in connection with the "argument" 
about the respective importance of Stalingrad and EI Alamein, 
that German tanks, painted sand-yellow for desert fighting ap-
peared at Stalingrad, but no German tanks painted white for 
snow-fighting were ever seen at El Alamein. 
As to the bombing of German-held Europe from the west 
at the time of the Battle of Stalingrad, it could not have 
helped much. Between the beginning of the war and May 25, 
1943 (i.e., about four months after the end of the Battle of 
Stalingrad), the R.A.F. Bomber Command had dropped only 
100,000 tons on Germany. The figure for the U.S.A.A.F. was 
certainly less. The total was probably about one-tenth of the 
total dropped on Germany from the west to the end of the 
war. 
THE THIRD PERIOD 
During the Battle of Stalingrad the Germans attempted to 
relieve their trapped Sixth Army Group with an attack by 
some eleven divisions from the southwest. The counter-blow 
was a ghastly failure. 
During the third period of the war, preceding the Battle of 
Kursk, the Germans repeated that maneuver in February-
March, south of the Donetz. Here they succeeded in stopping 
the Soviet offensive which was aiming at the elbow of the 
Dnepr and in saving their own troops in the Donetz Basin. 
This offensive between the Dnepr and Kharkov, in the early 
spring of 1943, was the last successful limited offensive of the 
German Army. It was successful in a strictly limited sense: it 
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saved the German troops in the Donbas from a huge trap, . it 
permitted the Germans to hold and exploit the mines of the 
Donbas for another eight months (until September, 1943), it 
checked the Soviet offensive which had rolled uninterruptedly 
from Stalingrad almost to the Dnepr, a distance of roughly 
400 miles in three months, it recaptured Kharkov. After that 
. and up to the end of 1944 the Germans staged counter-blows 
on a smaller scale-at Uman, in the Ukraine; at Kiev; in 
Galicia; at Warsaw; in the Baltic region; at Avaranches, in 
Normandy, in the Belgian Bulge; at Budapest; but not one 
of them succeeded in delaying their opponents more than for 
a few weeks and most of them ended for the Germans in dis-
aster. An analysis of these multiple operations of the Wehr-
macht conclusively shows that after November 19, 1942, the 
German Army was not able successfully to take the offensive 
on a strategic scale. The three great German offensive blows 
were delivered roughly with two-and-a-hal£ to three score divi-
sions at a time, in 1941 (Moscow), in 1942 (Stalingrad), and 
in 1943 (Kursk-Orel); of these the latter was a complete failure 
as we shall see presently. The counter-blows we mentioned 
before were conducted by the Germans with an average of 
between 12 and 20 divisions and, therefore, cannot be consid-
ered of strategic scope. Three big offensives and a dozen of-
fensive-defensive counter-blows-such are the highlights of the 
German operations in Europe after June 22, 1941. Of these 
fifteen operations, thirteen (three large ones and ten small 
ones) were directed against the Red Army and two small ones 
against the Western Allied armies. No German operation was 
successful after the Donetz local counter-blow in February, 
1943 (I do not count a small and temporary success like Kas-
sarine Pass, in Tunisia). This is important to remember in 
considering the last German strategic offensive attempt in the 
summer of 1943, around the Kursk Arc. 
Concurrently with and immediately after Stalingrad, the 
Red Army had lifted the blockade of Leningrad, and had 
recaptured Rostov (which had been lost to the enemy for the 
second time in 1942). It had pushed a salient beyond Kursk 
between the German-held strongholds of Orel and Kharkov. 
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~he Germans were afraid of this great salient which had 
been built up into a gigantic fortress (they were right because 
in fact the Kursk salient when it started rolling in early 
August, 1943, ended up 21 months later non-stop, goo miles ' 
and 1,100 miles to the west, on the Elbe and the Muerz.) 
The German High Command decided on a minimum and 
a maximum plan. Plan-minimum envisaged nipping off the 
Soviet salient at Kursk and the destruction of the Soviet 
armies concentrated there. Plan-maximum envisaged, in addi-
tion, a breakthrough of the Soviet front and a new march 
on Moscow. 
Just before this offensive, the Germans, sensing that the 
Western Allies, Italy-bent, would not invade France, concen-
trated 207 German and 50 satellite divisions on the Soviet 
front. Just as the Western Allies were taking their first steps 
in Sicily, the storm broke over the Kursk salient. 
Reviving the pincer-pattern, 17 armored divisions and 21 
infantry and motorized divisions struck at the Kursk arc from 
both flanks (from Orel and from Belgorod). No such concen-
tration of tanks had hitherto been assembled. (It was matched 
and bettered only by the Russians during the Oder break-
through in April, 1945). 
The German grand offensive lasted little more than two 
weeks and penetrated less than 20 miles in depth·. As the 
battle developed toward its climax, the Germans threw in 
one-fifth of the 250-odd divisions they had on the Eastern 
Front. A month after the start of the enemy offensive the 
Red Army had not only repelled it, but had captured Orel 
and Belgorod (the Western Allies captured Catania in Sicily 
on that very same day, August 5). The Germans on the 
Eastern Front had suffered in one month the following losses 
in men killed and captured (not counting the wounded), 
and materiel destroyed and captured: 
Men .... .. .... . ........... .... . ... . ... .. 132,00P 
Planes .. . .. . .... . . . .. . ... . ..... . ... . .. . . 2,500 
• Between July 5 and 14 the Germans lost 40,000 killed, 1,392 planes 
and 2,919 tanks. 
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The German front was broken through in the widest stra-
tegic sense of the word. The Soviet offensive spread from the 
Kursk bulge to the Dnepr and up and down its course, from 
the Smolensk Gap to the Black Sea. Generally speaking, after 
Kursk the Red Army never stopped anymore until it reached 
Berlin and Vienna, except to repel occasional German counter-
thrusts and for regrouping. After Kursk, never was the entire 
Eastern front quiet again, not even during the floods of 
Spring (in March, April and May, 1944, the Red Army 
marched to the Carpathians and recaptured Odessa and 
Sevastopol). After its terrific defeat at Kursk the Wehrmacht 
could only retreat with occasional attempts at making a stand 
on such exceptionally advantageous defensive positions as 
the Dnepr, the Dnestr, the Vistula, the Danube and the 
Oder and in the Carpathians. In fact~ the ((march to the Spree" 
was on. 
While the Battle of the Kursk Arc was developing (together 
with the subsequent Soviet offensive) and the Eastern Front 
was keeping some 250 enemy divisions busy, fighting on other 
fronts was engaging a score of enemy divisions in Sicily and 
Italy and another score or so in Yugoslavia. Thus, in the 
summer of 1943 the ratio between .the "volume of fighting" 
on the Eastern Front and on all the other fronts of Europe 
was more than 6: 1. This ratio will appear still more dramatic 
when one looks on the map at Sicily, Southern Italy and Yugo-
slavia on one hand and at the land mass between the Arctic 
Ocean and the Black Sea on the other. 
Let us now look at the amount of lend-lease materials re-
ceived by the U.S.S.R. up to the end of 1943, i.e., the stuff 
that was used by the Red Army during the campaigns of 
1943 (we have already seen that nothing could have been 
used at Moscow and very little in the days of Stalingrad and 
the 1942-1943 winter). 
FEA chief Leo T. Crowley reported in March, 1944 (New 
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York Times, March 12, 1944) that up to December, 1943, the 
U.S.S.R. had received lend-lease valued at $4,241,000,000, or 
slightly more than one quarter of the total amount lent and 
leased by the U.S.A. to Allied powers. This amount repre-
sented as far as munitions of war go, 7,800 planes, less than 
5,000 tanks, 33,000 "jeeps," 173,000 trucks, and other materials 
such as machines, food, special metals, etc. (This total by 
far did not reach the U.S.S.R. in time for the Battle of 
Kursk.) 
It is enough to turn back to the statistics of Soviet materiel 
losses during the first two years of the war to realize that this 
was a small, though welcome, addition to the Soviet arsenal. 
(During the first two years of war, the Red Army lost 35,000 
guns, 30,000 tanks and 23,000 planes and inflicted on the 
Germans the following losses: 56,500 guns, 42,400 tanks and 
43,000 planes.) 
THE FOURTH PERIOD 
This is the period beginnipg after the Battle of the Kursk 
Arc and ending with the German capitulation at Berlin. Al-
most two years of fighting are lumped together into one "pe-
riod," by me, because the campaigns of these two ' years are 
characterized by one common feature: the Red Army was al-
ways on the offensive and the German Army was always on the 
defensive. This "Kursk-Berlin" period can be subdivided into 
two distinct phases: during the first period (August, 1943-
June, 1944) the Red Army continued to fight the German 
Army virtually alone, thus rounding out almost three years 
during which the Western Allies fought only against minor 
enemy forces, while during the second phase the European 
war assumed its long-awaited two-front pattern. 
Following the victory of Kursk-Orel-Kharkov, the Red 
Army offensive spread along the front and in one sweep 
reached and hurdled the lower half of the Dnepr and 
reached the upper Dnepr. In the Fall it cleared the Donetz 
Basin. In the winter it broke the Germans on the Leningrad 
front and reached the N arova and the Lake of Pskov. In 
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the Spring it reached the Dnestr and crossed into Rumania 
over the Prut and reached the Carpathians. It cleared the 
Crimea and recaptured Sevastopol. In early June it crushed 
Finland. Thus, by the time the Western Front was opened 
by the Western Allies on June 6, 1944, the Germans in the 
East had already lost everything they had been fighting for. 
They had been frustrated in the attainment of all their stra-
tegic goals in the U.S.S.R., both unlimited and limited. 
During this phase, the Germans were keeping well over 
three-quarters of their divisions in the East because they well 
knew that the Western Allies were not ready to do anything 
except continue to fight the slogging campaign in Italy where 
they still faced the same twenty-odd enemy divisions, with the 
Yugoslav Army holding almost as many divisions with no 
tanks, a handful of planes, and no shipping to bring supplies. 
During this phase of the war the aerial offensive against 
Germany from the West was only beginning to hamper the 
German industrial effort, but the Red Army could not possibly 
have felt its effects until the end of 1944 and the beginning 
of 1945, if then. I say "if then" because the study of the 
operations of the latter period (such as the Battle of the 
Vistula and the Battle of Hungary) shows very plainly that 
the Germans did not lack equipment. This is proved, among 
other things, by the fact that during their defensive counter-
blow near Budapest around 'Christmas time, 1944, they were 
able to squander as many as 200 tanks a day during more 
than a week. An army which feels the industrial pinch cannot 
afford such lavishness. 
On March 7, 1944, we see a New York Times headline: 
"Air war at peak ... loose 2,000 tons on German capital." 
On May 2, 1944-"81,400 tons hit Nazis in April." On June 
2-"118,940 tons rained on Europe in May." July 3, 1944-
"122,750 tons poured on the Germans in June." 
Thus, from these figures we can draw the conclusion that 
of the roughl y 1,500,000 tons dropped on Germany and 
Europe during the whole war (from the West) less than 
500,000 tons were dropped during the time when the Red 
Army was retreating from the Bug to the Volga and advanc-
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ing from the Volga to the Upper Dnepr and the Dnestr, 
almost reaching its pre-1939 border and crossing it at some 
points. In November, 1943, the RAF and the U.S. Eighth 
Air Force dropped 13,000 tons according to the New York 
Times~ December 10, 1943; during August, September and 
October, 1943, the RAF and USAAF together dropped 
70,000 tons; a number of other figures, such as a weight of 
17,000 tons dropped during the "peak week" of February 13, 
1944, as reported in the New York Times of May 6, 1945, 
all show that the really heavy bombing of Germany started 
after the Red Army had already set Germany on her heels 
by wresting from her all the fruits of her conquests in the 
East. 
The tonnage of bombs dropped on German-held Europe 
from the west before D-Day (probably not more than half a 
million tons during roughly thirty months) is interesting 
to compare with the 66,000 tons of shells fired against the 
enemy by American forces during less than 3 months (82 days) 
on Okinawa. The area of Okinawa is less than 500 square 
miles. The area of German-held Europe was more than 
1,000,000 square miles: Europe in two years got only eight 
times the explosives the pin-point of Okinawa got in 82 days. 
The above figures conclusively prove the correctness · of 
the statement by Soviet Professor S. Vishnev, who says (Soviet 
Info'rmation BuZletin~ July 7, 1945): "Besides weapons and 
materiel, the Allies rendered economic support to the Red 
Army, weakening Germany's war potential by blockade and 
aerial bombing. Germany"s industrial centers hit by the 
Allied Air Forces were largely reduced, but the effect was not 
felt by the Soviet Armies before 1944-1945." 
Thus, up to the end of the second phase of the Fourth 
Period, i.e., up to the moment of the commencement of the 
final drive from two si~es, the Red Army had received only 
very scant assistance from any quarter and its emergence on 
a line running from Viborg to Narva, Gomel, Sarny, Czerno-
witz and Odessa must be credited overwhelmingly to the 
Soviet Union's own war effort. 
28 
The two-front war against Germany began at long last on 
June 6, 1944. This last phase was to last for eleven months . . 
The invasion of France was followed 17 days later by the 
Red Army offensive across the Upper Dnepi' (the Battle of 
Belorussia). While the Western Allies were battling in the 
Cotentin Peninsula (the Battle of the Hedgerows), the Red 
Army crashed from the Dnepr to the Bug and Neman, to 
the near approaches to Riga, to the Upper Vistula, and to the 
San. At the time of the Allied breakthrough at St. Lo, in 
Norma!ldy, the Red Army had cleared all Soviet territory 
except for tbe western half of the Baltic region and the 
southern part of Bessarabia. 
The over-all line-up of enemy forces during this campaign 
was approximately this: 100 enemy divisions facing the Allies 
in Western Europe, Italy and Yugoslavia; at least 240 enemy 
divisions facing the Red Army on a curving I,300-mile front 
from the mouth of the Narova (Gulf of Finland) to the mouth 
of the Dnestr (not counting the still active front in Lapland 
where action stopped only toward the end of October). The 
estimate of 240 enemy divisions operating on the Eastern 
Front in the summer of 1944 is based on the fact that the 
Germans themselves said they had 200 divisions between the 
Bal tic and the Carpathians alone, as well as on the incon-
trovertible fact that in the battles of encirclement at Minsk 
(July) and Kishinev-Jassy (August), as well as in Kurland, 
the Germans lost close to 55 divisions encircled and anni-
hilated, or blockaded and left to rot until they surrendered 
(in Latvia) in May, 1945. 
After August 1, while the Allied armies were sweeping 
almost without opposition from St. Lo to the German border, 
the Red Army was fighting for every town and village, for 
every marshy little river right up to the border of East 
Prussia and Czechoslovakia. While the Allies fought a counter-
blow by six German divisions at A ~anches, the Red Army 
warded off a counterblow by 30 German divisions before 
Warsaw. 
As the Allies entered Paris amid cheers, the Red Army en-
circled, near Jassy, 15 German infantry divisions and several 
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Rumanian divisions and shattered seven German divisions 
which tried to break through to their encircled troops. The 
Germans lost, at Jassy, 106,000 prisoners with 13 generals, 
830 tanks, 3,500 guns and 33,000 motor vehicles. This opera-
tion ushered in the brilliant march to Vienna which upset 
the entire German defense plan by attracting German strategic 
reserves to the southern wing of the front, and forcing them to 
weaken their Italian front by the withdrawal of several divi-
sions which were rushed into Hungary. 
In December, von Rundstedt began his ill-starred counter-
offensive against the Allies in the "Belgian Bulge." While this 
battle with 20 German divisions was raging, the Red Army 
was warding off a similar blow in the Budapest-Lake Balaton 
region. Rundstedt managed to escape from the Bulge with his 
best troops, but in Budapest almost a score of German and 
Hungarian divisions never got out of the trap. 
While the Allied Armies were regrouping and recuperating . 
from the Rundstedt blow, the Red Army opened its big winter 
offensive on the Vistula (Jan. 15, 1945), in East Prussia, and 
in Czechoslovakia. 
When the Western Allies made their famous crossing of 
the Rhine, at Remagen (early March, 1945), the Red Army 
had already reached the Oder and was getting ready to strike 
at Vienna. 
At last the pay-off was at hand. 
In the West the Germans offered only sporadic, spotty and 
uncoordinated resistance to the Allied Armies. Up to April, 
1945, any large movement of German troops took place usually 
from West to East. Now German divisions were scurrying 
westward ... to surrender to the Americans and British. 
While the Allies were marching, against little opposition, to 
the Elbe, the Red Army effected its massive breakthrough on 
the Oder (end of April) and began the battle of Berlin 
against 100-odd German divisions. Simultaneously, the East 
Prussian pocket was liquidated and the enemy defenses were 
broken through in Upper Silesia and in Austria. 
The Red Army battered its way into Berlin a day before 
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the British entered Hamburg and three days before General 
Patton roared into Linz. During five days after the German 
capitulation (May 8), the Red Army fought a whole German 
army group across the western part of Czechoslovakia. The 
last shots of the war were fired on the Eastern Front on 
May 13, 1945· 
The Cost 
HUMAN LOSSES 
Only the figures on American and British Empire losses 
have been made public. Taking only the killed, missing and 
prisoners, we see that U.S. losses are roughly 450,000 of which 
it is estimated that six-sevenths were incurred in the European- . 
African theatre of war. Thus, in the war against Germany, 
American casualties (killed, prisoners and missing) are about 
375,000 men. 
British Empire casualties (killed, prisoners and missing 
both in the Armed Forces and civilians) are roughly R65,000, 
of which probably 700,000 were incurred in the war against 
Germany and her satellites. Thus the total of Western Allied 
casualties (killed, prisoners and missing) in the war against 
Germany is slightly more than 1,000,000 men. 
Soviet military casualties have not been computed for the 
whole war. We know officially only that during the first three 
years of the war the Soviet Armed Forces lost (in killed, pris-
oners and missing) 5,300,000 men. Considering that during the 
fourth year of the war such gigantic battles as the Battle of 
Belorussia, Poland, the Danube, East Prussia and Germany 
were fought, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviet casual-
ties for the whole war are not far from 6.5 million men. Thus 
we have a ratio of 6.5: 1 as between Anglo-American casualties 
and Soviet casualties. 
As to casualties among the civilian population of the Soviet 
regions which were occupied by the Germans-"Thou alone, 
o Lord, knoweth their numbers." 
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MATERIAL COST AND LEND-LEASE 
The total amount in lend-lease materials sent by the U.S.A. 
to the U.S.S.R. through to April 1, 1945 is as follows (in 
thousands of dollars): 
Ordnance and ammunition ... .. . . ... .. . 
Aircraft and parts .. .... . . .. ,. .. .. .. .. . . 
Tanks and parts ..... .... . . . ...... . . . . 
Motor vehicles and parts .. ... .... . .. .. . 






All munitions . . ... .... ... ...... .. 4,151,591 
, Petroleum products . . . .. . .. . . ..... .. . . 84,878 
Industrial materials and products. . . .... 2,700,223 
Agricultural products . . . . . . .. ......... 1,473,003 
Total . .. . . ... .. . . . .... . . . . . . ... .. 8,409,695 
This total of almost eight and one-half billion dollars repre-
sents, among other thing: 
Planes . . ........ . . . . .... ... . . ... . .... . . 
Tanks ..... . . .... . .. . . .. .. .. . ..... . . .. . 
Tons of explosives . . .. . . . . .. . .... . .. .... 312,000 
Motor vehicles of all types .. ... ..... .... . 406,000 
If one adds to this the lend-lease material received by the 
U.S.S.R. from or through Great Britain, the total will amount 
to $10,000,000,000. 
The above figures have to be viewed against the back-
ground of other figures, such as the following: 
The U.S.A. spent on the war close to $300,000,000,000. 
Thus, even if one should include lend-lease from Britain, the 
U.S.S.R. received slightly more than three cents of every 
dollar spent on the war by the U.S.A. 
According to the estimate of French Minister Pierre Cot, 
the U.S.S.R. spent the equivalent of 170,000,000,000 gold 
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dollars on the war against Germany. Thus, if we accept the 
figure (and it is more than plausible, if one takes into con-
sideration the enormous amount of fighting done by the Red 
Army) we see that lend-lease equipment and materials 
amounted to less than 6 per cent of what the Soviet Union 
manufactured itself and used in the war. 
It also must be considered that a substantial part of lend-
lease went to the Soviet Far East to bolster the Far Eastern 
Red Armies for the eventual struggle against the Japanese 
Army. Thus, not all the munitions which were lent and leased 
to the U.S.S.R. went to the German front. 
It must also be remembered that the above figures represent 
stuff delivered f.o.b. at American ports. How much stuff was 
sunk in the terrible run to Murmansk, especially in the 
early months, we don't kno"w. 
And here is another angle to the question: On the basis 
of Soviet material battle losses during the first three years of 
the war only (3°,000 planes, 49,000 tanks and 48,000 guns), -
we can surmise that such Soviet losses for the' whole war were 
no less than 35,000 planes, 60,000 tanks and 60,000 guns. 
Now, the Red Army obviously not only replaced its losses, 
but added to its equipment as compared with the first years 
of the war. Thus, taking the losses to be one-third of the stuff 
available at the time, we see that Soviet industry must have 
produced no less than four times the above figures of losses 
(inclusive of replacements) i.e'7 a total of some 140,000 planes, 
240,000 tanks and 240,000 guns. 
These figures are borne out by the following fragmentary 
data: one Soviet tank factory alone produced 35,000 tanks 
during the war; one factory alone built 15,000 planes; the 
Stalin Ordnance Works alone produced 95,000 guns of all 
calibres. 
Looking at the lend-lease figures of materials shipped to 
the U.S.S.R. during the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, 
we see that the amount could not have had an appreciable 
influence on their outcome. (Practically no materials had 
alTived during the Battle of Moscow. As to the battle of 
33 
Stalingrad, only about one-seventh of all lend-lease stuff 
had reached the U.S.S.R. at that time.) 
At the time of the Battle of Kursk when the -last German 
offensive attempt was shattered, the U.S.S.R. had been allotted 
only slightly more than $2,000,000,000 of stuff (the Uniteq 
Kingdom had already received two and one-half times that 
amount). 
Thus we see very plainly that the decisive battles of Moscow 
and Stalingrad were won almost exclusively with Soviet stuff. 
The victory in the Battle of Kursk was made easier by lend-
lease. 
It must, of course, be understood that such inconspicuous 
lend-lease items as those entered as "miscellaneous" probably 
contain precious alloy metals, vitamins, or sulfa drugs, etc., 
whose value in the struggle cannot be measured in tons or 
dollars because they mean the saving of human lives through 
tougher tank armor, better diet, medication, etc. 
In order to grasp the whole idea of -lend-lease, one must 
understand its basic meaning: the U.S.A. in 1941, 1942, and 
, even 1943, was not able to put enough trained men in the 
field to use all the stuff they could produce under the peace-
ful conditions prevailing in the U.S.A., with their immense 
resources and industrial establishments. It was natural then 
for the U.S.A. to give part of what it produced to those men 
who were on the spot, were trained to use the stuff and were ' 
in a position to use it to the best advantage. 
, Some of the stuff lent and leased was as important, to take 
a trivial and homely example, as a box of matches while 
camping. One man cut, trimmed and hauled the wood for 
the camp fire. Another brought the matches. True, it would 
have been possible to light the fire by rubbing sticks, but it 
would have taken so much longer. Without the 400,000 
trucks and other vehicles received by the Red Army it would 
undoubtedly have moved slower. Without vitamins and lard 
it would have been weaker. Without sulfa drugs more men 
would have suffered more. And so on down the line. 
Lend-lease was well given and well used. This means that 
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it was to the mutual advantage and all talk about Hcharity," 
or "ingratitude" is so much nonsense. 
The object of talking about it at all, except for the record, 
is to show that on one hand lend-lease was highly important, 
on the otber that the U.S.S.R. did not in the least "live on 
lend-lease ' only" because it produced, on its own resources, 
90 per cent of some items, 75 per cent of others, 100 per cent 
of still others, probably an average of 95 per cent of all it used 
in this war (this estimate is based on the figures of . the prob-
able total cost of the war to the U.S.S.R. and on the value of 
lend-lease received). 
I think that Generalissimo Stalin put' the whole thing clearly ' 
when he said on June 12, 1945, in a message to President 
Truman: 
"On the day of the third anniversary of the conclusion 
of the Soviet American agreement on the principles to 
be applied to mutual assistance in the conduct of the war 
against aggression, I beg. you and the U.S. Government 
to accept this expression of gratitude from the Soviet 
Government and myself personally. 
"This agreement, on the basis of which the U.S. 
throughout the whole war in Europe, through lend-lease, 
has been supplying the S. U. with arms, strategic mate-
rials and food, played an important part in and made a 
considerable contribution to the successful conclusion of 
the war against the common enemy, Hitlerite Germany." 
And Soviet People"s Commissar of Finance Arseny Zverev 
said, in presenting the 1945 budget to the Supreme Soviet 
(Parliament): 
"In making a preliminary review of the financing of 
the Red Army, we must remember the substantial assis-
tance received in 1944 as well as during this year from our 
Allies, in the form of armaments, materiel and foodstuffs." 
It would be unfair to deny that lend-lease assistance was 
"substantial," but it would be just as unfair to claim that it 
was these supplies, which, thrown into the scales, turned the 
balance in favor of Russia simply because the balance had 
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already been basically turned In the Battles of Moscow and 
Stalingrad. 
Lend.-Iease to the U.S.S.R. did not win the war, but it 
speeded its victorious conclusion. 
The Role of Air Power 
In speaking of the role of air power in the war against 
Germany, it is impossible to omit the so-called Battle of 
Britain. Without in the least d~tracting from the staunchness 
and courage of the British people;-qualities which are known 
all over the world-in a battle which made "so many owe so 
much to so few," this battle must be viewed in its true per-
spective. In the brilliant phrase of Churchill we find the very 
negation of . the erroneous idea that the so-called Battle of 
Britain could have won the war. No handful of heroic young 
men can win a modern global war. What British resistance did 
was to prevent the war from being dragged out for many 
years longer than it did, but it did not win it for the 'simple 
reason that it could not win it. 
The notion that Britain "stood alone" and repelled the 
Nazi flood from its shores also is erroneous. The myth of the 
Gennan invasion attempts in the late summer of i940 has 
been disp~lled. The famous invasion ba~ges photographed by 
British fliers in the mouth of the Schelde turned out to be 
only fifty in number and were hardly designed to carry the 
invasion. Another myth-the story of the wall of fire around 
Britain's shores burning to death the invasion ships and 
troops has also been exploded. Such a wall of fire was pre-
pared and we even saw it in the movies in 1945, but no Ger-
man invasion was burned in the purely experimental holo-
caust. 
But the fact that the Germans did not invade Britain 
remains incontrovertible. Why <l:idn't they .do it? 
History gives us an example and a parallel which is 'worth 
examining, but with all the caution with which historical 
parallels and "repetitions" should be approached. 
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In early 1805 Napoleon had collected an army of 130,000 
and was building 2,000 special flat-bottomed boats for the 
invasion of England. All this was concentrated at the camp 
of Boulogne. The British and French fleets in those days 
played a part not unsimilar to that which aviation played 
in 1940. Some people think that it was the defeat of the 
French fleet under Villeneuve at Trafalgar by Nelson which 
saved England. But the fact is that Napoleon suddenly lifted 
his camp at Boulogne in the summer of 1805 (weeks before 
Trafalgar) and marched to the Danube and the victories of 
Elchingen, Ulm and Austerlitz. He turned his back on Eng-
land in order to face the threat of the Austro-Russian coali-
tion on the Danube. 
Now, in 1940 the situation was not without parallel if one 
considers that precisely at the time when France was collaps-
ing and Germany seemed free to turn its entire armed might 
against almost defenseless England, the Red Army advanced 
to the Baltic, to the border of East Prussia, to the Prut and 
the mouths of the Danube, taking up its "initial position" 
for the coming epic struggle against Germany and German-
held Europe. Hitler read "the writing on the Eastern Wall." 
It is clear that this was the determining factor which made 
the modern "Napoleon" give up any idea of the invasion of 
England, and start preparing for his march to the East. 
Thus, it is clear that England was not in the least "alone" 
in that summer of ' 1940. The fact that so many Englishmen 
did not know it makes their heroic struggle still more glori-
ous in the eyes of the world. Between August 8 and October 31, 
1940, the British fought off a part of the Luftwaffe (but not 
all of it because the rest was watching the eastern ramparts). 
The British lost one out of every five houses destroyed or 
damaged, they lost several thousand people. They downed 
2,375 German planes and lost about 750 themselves. They 
lost 375 airmen killed. But their industries continued to grow 
and Britain emerged from the battle with a reorganized and 
rejuvenated army, because she had not been invaded and, 
except for the Channel Islands, FlO German 'foot was set on 
British soil. The key to that fact is to be found in Tallin, 
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Riga, Kaunas and Kishinev, into which the Red Army 
marched at that time. 
I have shown in preceding chapters that the aerial assault 
on German-held Europe could not have had any appreciable 
influence on the land war on the Eastern Front either in 1941, 
1942, or 1943. Thus, it is clear that the Soviet victories of 
Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and on the Dnepr were won 
without any appreciable assistance from the air power of 
the western Allies in a wide over-all sense (however, it is pos-
sible, of course, that, for example, a British air blow at the 
port of Rostock did hamper German communications on the 
Leningrad front for awhile). Now what about the campaigns 
of 1944? Were they materially assisted by Western air power? 
Numerous highly paid pressure salesmen for aviation con-
cerns' sanguine prime-ministers, certain enthusiastic air gen-
erals with a juvenile outlook on war, as well as numerous 
headline hunters have been trying ever since 1943 to sell the 
world the idea that air power, almost alone, was turning the 
trick. 
Chief Air Marshal Harris said in 1943: "Every ton of 
bombs dropped on German industries will save the lives of 
ten United Nations soldiers when the invasion comes." Ac-
cording to this statement, some fifteen million United Nations 
soldiers were saved by the bombing of Germany which is 
about twice the number they lost altogether, and about three 
times the number the western Allies put in the field. The 
absurdity of this assertion does not need any explanation. 
Fawning and servile Nazi generals and industrialists, diplo-
mats and even hausfrausJ trying to ingratiate themselves with 
the Western conquerors at the expense of the Eastern con-
querors, screamed, mumbled and whispered in a chorus: 
"You, Americans, won the war with your air power. We 
would never have been beaten if it were not for your 
bombers." 
On the other hand there are some factual statements and 
documents which throw a realistic light on the question of the 
role of strategic bombing on the German war effort during 
the years 1944 and 1945. Here are some of them: 
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John McCorm~ck of the New York Times reported from 
Nuernberg on April 30, 1945, that two industrialists of the 
gigantic Siemens-Sch.ucke.rt Co. st~ted that their company's 
production reached zts hzgh peak zn I944· 
In the preceding chapters we have shown that the Germans 
used military equipment with great lavishness as late as De-
cember, 1944 (at Budapest, for instance, and later on, in East 
Prussia, in Poland, and on the Oder). Obviously they were 
not short of planes, tanks, guns, shells, steel, oil, etc. 
However, such reasoning might not sound convincing to 
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some. 
Let us turn to various statements by Allied authorities who 
now see that the main difficulties confronting German in-
dustry are not so much plants and machines, but fuel and 
manpower. 
For instance, Drew Middleton cabled to the New York 
Times (July 15, 1945), from Frankfort-on-the-Main: 
"The factories, it will be argued, are, however, largely 
intact and capable of being rehabilitated into full pro-
duction in the near future. This isn't so. Considered 
against the background of German economy today, they 
cannot be expected to return to production for years to 
come. For industry includes not only the plant and physi-
cal assets but fuel and labor as well. And in Germany 
today the two principal shortages are coal and manpower, 
shortages which cripple every part of German economy." 
Before the end of the war, especially in 1944, these crip-
pling factors operated only partially. On the other hand the 
fact that German factories are "largely intact" is confirmed. 
Coal became scarce when it was seized. Men became scarce 
when they were killed and captured. 
However, the most convincing document is a statement by 
Senator Harley M. Kilgore (C. P. Trussell's Washington dis-
patch to the New York Times~ August 8, 1945) in which he 
said that captured documents of the German Ministry of 
Armaments and 'tVar Production (the reports were captured 
in the spring of 1945) showed that "in 1944 three times as 
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many armored fighting vehicles, more than three times as 
many fighter-bombers and eight times as many night bombers 
had been produced as in 1942 .... In 1944 coal mining in 
Germany was only slightly lower than in 1942, crude steel 
only 11 per cent lower. Additional power plants were made 
available in 1944 .... By the autumn of 1944 sufficient reserves 
of material had been accumulated, with the result that, in 
spite of more difficult conditions in the basic industry . . . 
the output of armaments could be maintained and in some 
cases even increased. . . . 
"Taking the basis of 100 per cent in 1942, hard coal pro-
duction in 1943 increased by 8 per cent. It was 11 per cent 
less last year. The production of aluminum increased by 3 
per cent in 1943, and in 1944 by 11 per cent 'more .... If the 
production of powder in 1942 be considered 100 per cent, it 
increased in 1943 to 158 per cent and reached 171 per cent 
. in 1944. Forty-five per cent more explosives was produced in 
1943 and 75 per cent more in 1944 than in 1942." 
Here are some facts submitted to the Kilgore Committee by 
investigators who have returned from Germany to report on 
the defeated nation's industrial capacity and the effects of 
air bombing: 
1. Germany today has 4,000,000 tons of machine tools and a 
vast undamaged capacity of producing more. 
2. The iron and steel industry, productive capacity 25,000,-
000 tons a year, can be restored with only minor repairs. 
3. The -great chemical and dye industry-including that part 
manufacturing explosives-is only slightly damaged. 
4. The synthetic rubber industry can produce 10,000 tons 
a year. 
5. If the war had lasted six months more the entire oil 
refining and storage industry would have been underground, 
safe from all bombing (this was before the atomic bomb 
was announced). 
"The total German productive capacity affected by the 
bombing," sums up London's Tribune (July 20) "was about 
20 per cent; less than half the earlier expert estimates by 
Bomber Command Public Relations. 
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"These are hard facts. They show that bombing did not 
win the war, contrary to what each and all of the captured 
German generals hastened to assure us. 
"Bombing did contribute to final victory, but essentially so 
only when it was harmonized with land operations." (In Fact~ 
August 20, 1945·) 
Thus, we see that even in 1944 and in the beginning of 
1945, strategic bombing did not reduce materially the power 
of Germany to resist and that the common victory of the 
Allies must be chiefly credited to the valor, skill and power 
of their armies. It follows from this, in the light of all the 
foregoing, that the Red Army carried the overwhelming 
burden of the war against Germany and her satellites from 
June 22, 1941, until June 6, 1944, or during almost three 
years. It carried the larger part of the burden from June, 
1944, right up to V-E Day. 
The Soviet Air Force 
Soviet military doctrine never envisaged air power as some-
thing which could bring a decision by itself. The Soviet Air 
Force is closely integrated with and in the Army and Navy. 
Its main function was not strategic bombmg, but close support 
of the land operations. The plane was not considered as a 
"thing in itself," but as a member of a close-knit team work-
ing on land, sea and in the air. 
The record of the Soviet Air Force is nothing to be dis-
missed with a shrug. On the basis of the known figure of 60,-
000 German planes downed on the Eastern Front during the 
first three years of war, it is reasonable to assume that Soviet 
fliers and AA-defenses have disposed of approximately 80,000 
German planes during the whole war. 
Information about the work of the Soviet Air Force is frag-
mentary. But some of these fragments can give one an idea 
of what the Soviet fliers did. . 
For instance we know that in the Spring of 1943 Soviet fliers 
had to fight three large-scale air battles. The Germans massed 
2,000 planes over the Kuban area, picked squadrons at that. 
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More than 100 air battles were fought here every day. Soviet 
fliers destroyed more than half of the enemy planes and main-
tained their initiative. 
Just before the Battle of Kursk, the Germans launched 
massed air raids on Rostov, Kursk, Yaroslavl, Gorky and other 
cItIes. Kursk alone was raided repeatedly by 500-600 enemy 
bombers. All onslaughts were repelled with huge losses to the 
Germans. 
During the Battle of Kursk itself, i.e., during its first days, 
more than 1,000 German planes were downed. 
Right from the start of the Battle of Belorussia int" the sum-
mer of 1944, the Luftwaffe was swept out of the skies by the 
Soviet fliers. 
Soviet fliers and AA-defenses destroyed throughout the war 
an average of more than 50 German planes per day. 
The Soviet Navy 
The four years of struggle of the Soviet Navy in theatres so 
close to land differed markedly from classic naval wars. There 
were no grand naval battles between the main forces of the 
opposing fleets. N either were there usual lulls in fighting 
which inevitably follow major engagements. 
The Baltic, Black and Barents Seas extended along the 
1,800-mile flanks of the vast land front where the outcome of 
the war was being decided. Naturally, operations at sea were 
subordinated to the objectives of the land front. The prin-
cipal task of the Soviet Navy was to facilitate the .operations 
of the army. The Germans on the other hand did not wish 
to risk their major naval units against the Soviet Navy be-
cause they intended to keep them intact for the future inva-
sion of Britain, when victory over the U.S.S.R. had been won. 
The Soviet Navy not only protected the communication 
lines to Murmansk as well as across the Black Sea, but it took 
part in countless amphibious operations. Its river flotillas did 
yeoman work hand in hand with the Red Army. 
Just as in the case of the Soviet Air .Force, there are no 
comprehensive data on the work of the Soviet Navy as yet. 
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However, fragmentary data are available and they give a fairly 
good idea of the whole. . 
In the summer of 1942 Soviet submarines sank more than 
60 German transports in the Baltic (total displacement-
500,000 tons). . , . . 
During the five weeks precedIng the ejectIon of the Ger-
mans from the Crimea, 200 German and Rumanian ships 
were sunk in the Black Sea. 
In the four weeks preceding the ouster of the Germans from 
Lapland, more than 150 enemy vessels were sunk in the Far 
North. 
In March, 1945, 350 ,000 tons of enemy shipping was sunk 
in the Baltic. 
These figures show that the naval war in the East, though 
devoid of major naval battles, inflicted trelnendous losses on 
the enemy and the Soviet Navy can match the Battle of the 
Atlantic with the long and gruelling Battles of the Barents, 
Bal tic and Black Seas. 
Summary 
All of the foregoing has served to demonstrate the following 
truths: 
1. The Soviet Union made the major contribution toward 
victory in World War II under incomparably more adverse 
external conditions than those under which Russia was 
defeated in World War I. Obviously, the explanation of this 
fact lies in the internal conditions of the country. 
2. Russia had space at its command, in fact more space 
than the Soviet Union had '(the central sector of the border 
of the Russian Empire in 1914 was some 250 miles farther 
from Moscow than the border of the U.S.S.R. was in 1941). 
As to the climate-snow, mud, frost, etc.-it can be said the 
climate of the Soviet Union is no different than the climate 
of Imperial Russia. Furthermore; it must be noted that the 
Red Army won its greatest victories in winter, summer, 
autumn and spring. 
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3. The decisive battles of the Soviet-German war, at, 
Moscow and Stalingrad, were won without appreciable assist-
ance either from the Western air war against Germany or 
from lend-lease. During the summer battles of 1943 both 
categories of help were only beginning to be felt. How-
ever, neither type of help became considerable until the fourth 
period of the war. 
4. The Soviet people have paid the greatest price of all 
nations in blood, devastation and treasure. They could stand 
the price because of their internal organization. While Im-
perial Russia was growing weaker and weaker under the 
hammerblows of World War I, the Soviet Union was growing 
stronger and stronger in the war against Germany and its 
satellites. This radical and decisive difference cannot be 
credited to the "traditional" heroism of the Russian people, 
simply because this quality was inherently present in 1914. 
5. The course of the war plainly shows that it was the 
Battle of Moscow which killed the blitz and the legend of 
German invincibility, and the Battle of Stalingrad which 
marked the end of German offensive power. 
It now remains to be seen what made this tremendous and 
brilliantly successful Soviet war effort possible. 
The over-all plan of this effort was broadcast by Marshal 
of the Soviet Union Stalin in his radio address of July 3, 1941 
(twelve days after the German attack). In this address, con-
ceived in the darkest hours Russia had ever experienced, 
Marshal Stalin expressed the supreme confidence of the 
Soviet people in victory when he said "this ( the German) 
army . . . can be smashed and will be smashed, as were the 
armies of Napoleon and Wilhelm." 
At the same time he proceeded, calmly and deliberately to 
outline the nation's plan of defense. 
The concept of the People' s War was expressed in the words: 
"Side by side with the Red Army, the entire Soviet people 
are rising in defense of \ their native land." 
The concept of scorched earth was expressed in the words: 
"In case of forced retreat of Red Army units ... the enemy 
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must not be left a single engine, a single railroad car, not a 
single pound of grain or gallon of fuel. ... All valuable 
property ... which cannot be withdrawn must be destroyed 
without fail." 
The plan for guerrilla (partisan) warfare in the enemy rear 
was planned as follows: 
"In areas occupied by the enemy, guerrilla units, mounted 
and on foot, must be formed, diversionist groups must be 
organized to combat the enemy troops, to foment guerrilla 
warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges and roads, to damage 
telephone and telegraph lines, to set fire to forests, stores and 
transports. " 
The concept of the G1~eat Patriotic War was expressed thus: 
"This war with fascist Germany cannot be considered an 
ordinary war. It is not only a war between two armies; it is 
also a great war of the entire Soviet people against the 
German-fascist forces. The aim of this national war in defense 
of our country ... is not only elimination of the danger 
hanging over our country, but also aid to all European 
people groaning under the yoke of German fascism." 
And, prophetically he declared: 
"In this war. of liberation we shall not be alone. In this 
great war we shall have loyal allies in the peoples of Europe 
and America. . . . Our war for the freedom of our country 
will merge with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and 
America for their independence, fo! democratic liberties .... " 
Finally, on popular levies to assist the Red Army in combat, 
especially in the defense of great cities (such as Leningrad, 
Odessa, Tula, Moscow, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Sevastopol): 
" ... popular levies must be raised in every city which is 
in danger of enemy invasion, all the working people must 
be roused to defend our freedom, our honor, our country .... " 
And on the leadership for this great effort: 
"In order to insure rapid mobilization of all the forces of 
the peoples of the U.S.S.R .... a State Committee of Defense 
has been formed in whose hand the entire power of the State 
has been vested. The State Committee of Defense has entered 
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on its functions and calls upon all our people to rally around 
the Party of Lenin-Stalin and around the Soviet Government 
so as self-denyingly to support the Red Army and Navy, 
destroy the enemy and secure victory." 
Here was the grandiose plan which made the Soviet war 
effort possible. Titanic effort is reflected in its every word. 
Take for instance the four simple words in the sentence 
about the destruction or evacuation of valuable property-
uwhich cannot be withdra'iv.n." But great industries 'were with-
drawn and "put on wheels" in the Ukraine, in Belorussia, in 
Leningrad, and the Donbas. They were moved in July and 
August, 1941, hundreds of (and even more than a thousand) 
miles to the east and set up in the wilderness with ' such dis-
patch that their military products-tanks, guns and planes 
made their appearance at the front in November, during the 
crucial Battle of Moscow. The men who set up these industries 
often lived in igloos and snow dugouts for weeks because the 
machine shops had to be set up before the dwellings for the 
men could be built. 
Take, for instance, a tank factory evacuated in July, 1941, 
from the vicinity of Kharkov to somewhere around N izhni-
Taghil in the Urals. The distance by rail is ' more than 1,200 
miles. The trip east over bombed rail lines, against the tide 
of general mobilization moving west, the setting up of factory 
buildings in the wilderness, the unspeakable conditions 'of 
cold and privation are an epic in themselves. And in spite 
of all that, tanks manufactured in the transplanted factory 
made their appearance in the Battle of Moscow, only four 
months later. 
Perhaps the reader of this account will feel that in setting 
up the balance sheet of the war I did not give enough credit 
to the American-British Battle of the Atlantic. Of course, 
this battle was a miracle <?f organization, dogged determina-
tion, magnificent seamanship and all-around heroism, but isn't 
it balanced by the Battle of the Great Russian Plain in which 
whole industries moved eastward hundreds and thousands of 
miles and later their products moved back westward to the 
front? Only it was trains that moved instead of ships, with 
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men freezing in cabooses and on open platforms instead of on 
bridges and decks. Trains being bombed just as the ships 
were. The comparison would have been still more apt if the 
Allied convoys in the Atlantic had had to carry a lot of in-
dustries, say, from France in 1940 to Detroit, and then carry 
their products back to the European Front. The Battle of the 
Great Russian Plain was a two-way affair. 
The famous Soviet weapons such as the rocket-gun "Katu-
sha" (which later acquired quite a "family" in the persons of 
"Andryusha," "Ivan the Terrible," etc.), the new Stalin tank, 
the new fighters and "stormoviks" (attack planes), the anti-
tank gun, were born in the darkest days of the war, under 
the indescribable conditions of the mass migration of heavy 
industry to the East. 
Stupendous as these achievements are in themselves, the 
planning and controlling apparatus is still more stupendous. 
There is not the shadow of a doubt that all , this was planned 
and controlled by the Communist Party and its leaders. It was 
the Communists who invariably provided the leadership in 
partisan warfare and were the mainspring of the total effort in 
the people's war. They knew where they were going and 
that is why they came to victory, in spite of all adverse condi-
tions and obstacles. 
The industrial effort of the Soviet Union under the condi-
tions described above can be fully appreciated by Americans 
reared in the tradition of American industrial achievement. 
It is a different matter with the concept of the People's War 
and Guerrilla War because America has never been invaded, 
at least for the last 175 years, and seven or eight generations 
of Americans never had the occasion to practice either type 
of warfare. 
This writer feels that it is not within his modest means to 
describe fully the magnificent scope and meaning of Soviet 
Guerrilla warfare and People's War-that defense in depth 
carried to its ultimate conclusion. 
He therefore appends two Soviet accounts, one written by 
a Guerrilla chief, the other by an eye-witness of the People's 
War. These two documents, which appear at the end of this 
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booklet, will tell at least part of the story much better than 
this writer ever could hope to do. 
Decision in the Far East 
The global war was bound to end globally. All the major 
Allied powers inevitably were to play a role in the Far 
Eastern decision. It had been clear ever since the day when 
the Soviet Union cancelled the Japanese concessions in 
Northern Sakhalin that the Red Army would take a hand 
in the conflict at the proper moment. Now Japan is, militarily 
speaking, through. Much has been said and written about the 
causes which precipitated the Japanese surrender. 
Over-enthusiastic scientists, justly proud of their successes 
in unleashing atomic energy, claim that it was the atomic 
bomb which finally licked Japan. 
Some air generals with a juvenile ou tlook on the facts of 
war and life as~ure the world that it was the superfortress 
which, basically, did the job. 
Here again we have two variants of the old so-called "air-
power-alone" theory. But the theory is no more convincing 
in Asia than it was in Europe. 
It is true that new and powerful factors entered the war 
against Japan in such quick succession that it is not easy 
to decide which one of them was most instrumental in break-
ing Japan's "moral back." 
Large scale bombing of Japan from the Marianas bases 
started in the Spring. Admiral Halsey and his Third Fleet 
went on the rampage along the shores of Japan on July 10, 
and kept up a constant bombardment for three weeks. The 
atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6. The 
Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8. 
On the face of it, Japan surrendered only after the Soviet 
Union declared war. True, she had offered (tentatively) to 
surrender in mid-July, but somehow nothing came of it then. 
Japan had built up a great continental military and indus-
trial base in Manchuria. She most probably had hopes at least 
to prolong the war by holding out there even after Allied 
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landings in Japan were made. The military leadership of the 
United States was obviously figuring on that because as late 
as the first week in August there still was seemingly serious 
talk of the need of seven million American troops to subdue 
the Japanese army in Asia. 
The entry of the Soviet Union into the fray made all this 
unnecessary. The ten-day whirlwind campaign of the three Far 
Eastern Soviet armies over a theatre of more than half a mil-
lion square miles was a blow which knocked the props from 
under any Japanese idea of continuing resistance outside 
Japan itself. 
The truth of the matter is that while Soviet military action 
in Manchuria shortened the war for the United States, so 
the brilliant three-year effort of the armed forces of the United 
States made the Soviet whirlwind tempo in Manchuria pos-
sible. . 
The main military factor, within the limits of the period of 
warfare in the Far East and in the Pacific, contributing to the 
defeat of Japan, was the dogged, efficient and heroic march 
of American forces from the International Dateline to the 
shores of Japan. The greater glory (if glory can be thus 
apportioned) goes to the 'U nited States Navy and its correlated 
branches of the service. 
However, i~ considering the actions from Tarawa to 
Okinawa and from Guadalcanal to Borneo and Luzon, we 
should not forget the fact that all these countless hard-won 
enemy strongholds would have been garrisoned by the Japan-
ese much more strongly, if the Soviet Union had not managed 
to keep about a million crack troops on the Manchu border 
throughout the European war (even when, in the life and 
death struggle before Moscow and Stalingrad, every single 
man counted) thus immobilizing a large Japanese army. 
Here are some figures on the Japanese contingents in 
Manchuria: 
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Late 1941 (Battle of Moscow·) . .... ... 1,000,000 men 
1,000 tanks 
1,500 planes 
Only in 1943-1944 did the Japanese forces in Manchuria 
decrease somewhat because the Japanese command realized 
that it was too late to attack the Soviet Union, but still too 
early for the Soviet Union to attack her. But the moment 
Germany surrendered, Japanese troops began to stream north-
ward from China into Manchuria to face the threat of the 
Red Army thus enabling Chiang Kai-shek's troops to win 
some local victories south of the Yangtze. 
The question arises now as to why the Japanese did not 
attack the Soviet Union at the time of the Battle of Moscow 
or the Battle of Stalingrad? The answer is that they had 
received two painful lessons in 1938 and 1939 (at Changku-
feng and at the Kalkin-Ghol) and had found out that their 
army could not stand up against the Red Army even under 
circumstances favorable to Japanese arms. 
General (now Marshal) Zhukov had, in the summer of 1939 
at Kalkin-Ghol, given the Japanese a foretaste of what was 
going -to happen to them in the summer of 1945. The result 
was that ever since then the Japanese, while keeping more or 
less quiet in Manchuria, were compelled to divert to that po-
tential front a great portion of their best troops from the 
struggle against the United States and Great Britain. Thus 
the contribution of the Soviet Union in the Far Eastern war 
goes far beyond the actual fighting which took place after 
August 8, I945. It antedates Pearl Harbor by almost three 
and one-half years. 
This contribution should be viewed against the background 
of the terrific struggle of the Red Army against Germany. The 
ability to maintain a large and modern, almost self-sufficient 
establishment some 5,000 miles from the European front when 
every man and every gun were needed before Moscow, Stalin-
grad and Leningrad, is a great achievement in itself. 
• At that time Japan kept in Manchuria half of her artillery, three-
quarters of her cavalry and two-thirds of her tanks. 
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APPENDIX 
GUERRILLAS OF THE UKRAINE 
By MAJOR GENERAL SIDOR KOVPAK 
Twice Hero of the Soviet Union 
The guerrillas of the Ukraine had reason to be envious of 
their comrades in Byelorussia who were fighting the invaders. 
The vast forests and impassable swamps of Byelorussia were 
favorable arenas for partisan warfare. Every detachment and 
. unit of the guerrillas there had its zone of action and a more 
or less stable base in the forests, to which it returned after 
an operation. 
Steppes predominate in the Ukraine. Facilities for shelter 
are rare or non-existent. A blind emulation of the tactics used 
by the Byelorussian guerrillas would lead to futile losses. 
Other tactics had to be worked out. We discovered that the 
most effective method for us was a ' swift and complex maneu-
ver, and we formed our striking units accordingly. Safety lay 
in the suddenness of our appearance, the brevity of blows 
dealt, and our swift withdrawal to great distances. 
September 10, 1941 was a memorable day in my life. A 
peaceful civilian chairman of the City Soviet of Workers 
Deputies in the town of Putivl, Sumy Region, I made the 
decision to remain in the territory occupied by the Germans 
and to organize a guerrilla force. 
My group at first included 13 people with whom I had 
worked at various times and whom I could trust. Two months 
passed in minor acts of diversion, a study of the enemy's 
tactics, and most of all in establishing contact with the 
population. 
In guerrilla warfare the sympathy of the people and reliable 
and constant contact with them are everything. Such warfare 
is inconceivable without the support of the people; if the 
population is with you, then you are invincible, no matter 
how strong and well-armed the enemy may be. He who fails 
to understand this cannot understand the essence of our 
strength. 
Certain of finding supporters everywhere, and having estab-
lished . close contact with reliable people in the towns and 
villages, our detachment grew rapidly. Without difficulty I 
increased the number of my fighting men to 2,500. More could 
have been added, but I did not consider this expedient. The 
larger the striking units, the more difficult it would be to 
maneuver, and the greater the tendency to diminish the pac~ 
of action. 
Constantly in action against the enemy beyond his lines 
and in his hinterland, our detachment covered some 15,000 
kilometers and several times forced such rivers as the Desna, 
Dnepr, Pripet, Prut and Driestr. We moved on an average 
of 25 kilometers dailJ. This is no mean distance when one 
remembers that our men advanced only by night and on foot; 
our horses carried only the wounded and sick, ammunition 
and food. 
We were well armed with tommy guns and machine guns, 
trench mortars and light cannon, including several 76-mm. 
guns. Like all guerrillas, we acquired our arms at the expense 
of the enemy. 
I can say without exaggeration that we grew to be a terror 
to the Germans. After striking a sudden blow and routing 
one of the enemy garrisons, we would vanish as abruptly as 
we had appeared, burning the bridges behind us. The Ger-
mans would strike out in all directions, but within a short 
time we would hit them again, some 200 to 300 and even 500 
kilometers from the former place. 
Having acquired considerable battle experience in the war 
zone, we began operations in the remote rear of the enemy. 
Here are some examples: 
In June, 1943, when the Red Army was fighting its historic 
battle at the Kursk bulge, we were engaged in an operation . 
in the Rovensk Region, some 800 kilometers from the front. 
The Germans never expected us here. They had placed a 
price on my head long before, but now displayed incredible 
generosity. In their newspapers they published a notice that 
they would pay ' for my head 100,000 ru hIes in gold or bullion, 
as the murderer desired. This was a lot of money and I 
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couldn't help feeling a bit flattered. Not once, however, did 
the Germans catch me. 
Finally they combed the Rovno forests in grand style. 
We had had similar experiences on no less than 30 previous 
. occasions-and this time too we broke out of the encirclement . 
. Pushing westward to surprise the Germans we penetrated to 
the oilfields of Drogobych, in the Carpathians. This was in 
July, 1943. While the Red Army was crushing the enemy's 
defenses at Sumy and. Belgorod, we were destroying oilwells, 
cracking plants and pipe-lines in the Carpathians, a thousand 
kilometers from the front. 
uWieder Kovpak!" (Kovpak again!) screamed the German 
newspapers, and this time the enemy sent eight of his picked 
regiments and five battalions to intercept us at Drogobych. 
They planned to force us against the Carpathian heights. By 
a complex maneuver we evaded them and got away in an 
easterly direction to the Sluch River. True to our rules, our 
partisan units on their way inflicted heavy losses on the 
Germans. We approached our rendezvous in seven groups 
along a front of 200 kilometers. 
All that could prove of value to the enemy was burned and 
destroyed: 
There are some who say the successes of my detachment 
were gained by sheer luck. Luck has been, with us at times, of 
course, but it is impossible to beat the enemy again and again 
by luck alone. Miracles don't happen in war. Those who are 
unable to fight well are soon abandoned by fortune. Guerrilla 
actions require creative skill. I remember one occasion when· 
fortune seemed to smile exclusively upon the enemy. Pursuing 
us, the Germans closed in between the Dnepr and Pripet 
Rivers. Here they massed six infantry divisions and two tank 
regiments. 
Superior in armaments, the enemy also outnumbered us 
20 to one. We were pressed against the Pripet and harried 
from its surface by five armored tugs and 10 other well-armed 
ships. It seemed they had us-and the Germans no doubt 
. anticipated the pleasure of an easy victory. Fierce fighting 
began, lasting for two days. The situation became puzzling: 
53 
we were beating the Germans, instead of their beating us. 
They were never given a chance to beat us. The trick was 
simple. Filtering through to the woods, we arose on the 
enemy's flanks, struck suddenly, annihilated as many as we 
could, and vanished. While our tommy guns mowed the 
Germans down, now here and now there, our artillerymen 
gave their attention to the enemy boats, and our sappers built 
a floating bridge 240 meters long. Destroying the flotilla, we 
crossed the river and got away. 
This engagement cost the Germans 1,100 dead officers and 
men. Our losses were one man killed and four wounded. 
This could scarcely be termed luck. The entire operation was 
well conceived and skilfully carried out. 
My detachment during its period of action annihilated 
18,000 German soldiers and officers-including three generals. 
We also burned 55,000 tons of oil cached by the Nazis, derailed 
many of their trains and wrecked many trucks loaded with 
war materials. Our losses have been comparatively small. 
Still in action in the Carpathians, my men are adding to 
their list of victories day by day. 
The following figures may give an idea of the scale of 
guerrilla actions in the Ukraine: The main detachments in 
the Ukraine, exclusive of communications groups and scouts 
in towns and villages, numbered 115,000 men. In all, this 
force annihilated 310,000 German soldiers and officers, wrecked 
4,060 locomotives and 39,700 freight cars, and blew up or 
burned 6,693 trucks, 810 tanks and armored cars, 324 guns 
and 108 aircraft. 
The German conquerors hoped to establish themselves 
firmly on the steppes of the Ukraine. They dreamed of 
colonizing this country of lush pastures where Ukrainian 
shepherd slaves would tend the splendid herds for them; 
of fertile fields where people would gather great harvests of 
wheat for them; of mines where subjugated people would 
dig coal and ores for their enslavers. 
Things turned out differently, and this was due in a 
measure to the part played by the comrades-in-arms of the 
Red Army-the Ukrainian guerrillas. 
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TDEROADTDROUGDTDESWAMPS 
By YURI. NAGIBIN 
The old man approached the colonel's dugout by way of a 
secret forest path. Many of the trees had been hit by shells, 
and were exuding resin and transparent sap through their 
wounds. He watched a soldier fit some cups to a stricken birch, 
saw them fill rapidly with the clear sap, and silently approved 
of the Red Army's thriftiness. 
The colonel's dugout was lit by a sooty kerosene lamp. 
There were two men inside-the colonel and his aide-de-camp. 
The colonel was bent over some papers. The other was playing 
a gramophone-the record was "The Blue Scarf." He had 
stuffed the sleeve of his quilted jacket into the amplifier, so 
that the noise should not disturb the colonel. \ 
But he was not even aware of the music. He was reading 
and re-reading the message that lay before him. It informed 
him that two truckloads of ammunition had got through to 
a group that had wedged its way far into the German lines. 
But the road was under fire. It was extremely doubtful how 
long it could be kept open. 
The men, full of ardor after their successful breakthrough, 
were marking time and losing momentum. But the command 
could not supply enough sappers to lay another road. And 
in any case, where could another road be laid, when all around 
was impassable, sedge-grown swamp? 
There was only one last hope-the villagers of Lyubino 
Polye, a little marshland settlement recently liberated from 
the Germans. And that was why the colonel had sent for the 
old man, the chairman of the village Soviet. 
The colonel had grown very fond of the sturdy, clean people 
who inhabited these northern places. Taken unawares in their 
village by the Germans, they had not remained in their homes 
for a single day. The very first night of the occupation they 
had picked off the German sentry and gone off to the woods 
with their wives and children. 
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Even the cripples had crawled off with their fellow-villagers. 
The only traitor among the lot-one mangy sheep from an 
otherwise sound flock-had his fate decided for him by the 
men of Lyubino Polye, who stole into the village under the 
noses of the Germans, and did away with him in their 
own way. 
The people of Lyubino Polye were capable and industrious. 
They knew the swamps, knew how to fight them. They knew 
how to build a house in the fenlands, how to lay a road or 
plan a park. They knew every mood of the swamps. 
Furthermore, from ancient times they had been known for 
their excellent woodwork. They were cabinet-makers, carpen-
ters, bridge-builders. It was said of them that they had stolen 
the soul of a tree, and that was how they knew all the secrets 
of wood. 
I t was part of the -village tradition that the young men 
should specialize in carved cradles, things of wonder and de-
light. The wood they made those cradles from had a remark-
able melodious quality, as though there were lute-strings in 
it, so that when the cradles rocked they sang of themselves 
and lulled the children to sleep. 
In their later years, nearer to the twilight of their lives, the 
Lyubino Polye craftsmen turned to road-making and bridge-
building, and in their old age, by tradition, they made only 
coffins. These coffins were dependable, solid affairs, which the 
people of the district ordered in advance. 
* * :1(1 
The old man spoke deliberately: "We've talked the matter 
over, Colonel, and you needn't worry. You don't need your 
sappers. They'll come in handy somewhere else. This r<;>ad-
building job is a simple matter for us." 
"But surely you can't manage without help?" the colonel 
asked, amazed. "Will you really be able to do it on your own?" 
"Well; not like sappers would do it, of course," said the 
old man with a discreet smile. "We may even do it a little 
better." 
The colonel thought. Then he sighed. He stood up and 
spoke firmly. "Quite impossible, I'm afraid. The zone will be 
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under fire, and enough of your folk have been killed already 
iij. the guerrilla detachments." 
"My dear boy, people are like corn. You can grow a whole 
field from a single grain. And we are fighting for life." 
"Grandpa, I can't let you." 
uN ow you leave it to us. We'll build it on the quiet .. " 
"But how can you hide what you're doing?" 
"Come, come," grinned Grandpa. "Don't ask a craftsman 
to give away his secrets." 
"Well," said the colonel, sitting down again. "I'm acting 
against my better judgment. How long will it take you?" 
"Thirteen days." 
"Beter make it three weeks." 
"Thirteen days," insisted Grandpa. "The number thirteen 
is sacred in Lyubino Polye. We drive thirteen nails into each 
coffin lid. And the timber has to be treated for thirteen weeks , 
before it can be used for ikons." 
:I(: :1(: ' :1(: 
Next day five old men in white newly-washed homespun 
tunics set out along the road which led to the advanced group 
of Soviet forces, the vanguard that had wedged deep into the 
German lines. There was not a soul in sight. Only the wrecked 
trucks by the wayside belied the stillness. 
To the left of the road there was a sniper-infested copse. 
To the left, also, the swamp was visible, an unhealthy bright 
green, with a bush here and there. The old men moved along 
a river-bank skirting the swamp. After about a mile they 
branched off, and four of them kneeled down and inspected 
the grass. Then they reported the result of their inspection 
to the fifth, Grandpa Kondratenkov, the oldest and most 
experienced of the party. 
He was so ancien! that he had forgotten .his own age, nor 
was there anyone in the village who could enlighten him, 
for the oldest person remembered him first as a full-grown I 
man with a tinge of gray in his beard. I 
"A likely spot," Makar Savelyich suggested. 
"Mark it out, Makarushka," said Grandpa. "Mitrofanych, 
you hurry back to the village: Tell the men to say goodbye 
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to their womenfolk. Tell 'em they're going to live a military 
life from now on." 
Four old men moved across the bright swamp toward the 
forest. In the forest they pulled their belts tighter and, hatchets 
in hand, strode off through the thickets to mark off trees, 
those that were straightest, and with the cleanest trunks. 
"Don't take 'em too close together, boys," Grandpa warned. 
"Or the Germans in those tree-tops will notice the gaps." 
By noon, the other old men of the village had reached the 
spot, and work proceeded apace. 
After marking the necessary number of trees, the old men 
removed their padded jackets and lay down for a nap until 
the protective darkness fell. Then, when the moon appeared 
from behind the clouds, there was a dull tapping in the 
swampy wood by the river, as though huge woodpeckers with 
metal bills were pecking away at the trees. 
Each tree was felled with three strokes: the first was an 
oblique one, and tore off a long strip of bark, as though 
preparing the tree for pain and death. The second stroke 
penetrated the tree to the very core. The third, dealt with 
the butt-end of the axe, severed the tree from its life-giving 
roots. The tree toppled to the ground, its leaves swishing sor-
rowfully through the branches of its neighbors. 
Each tree was trimmed of its lower branches. Then the 
old men lashed the logs together in rafts . 
• 
A week later the colonel sent his aide to see how the work 
was progressing, and to ask if the old men needed any help. 
But all he could get out of them were barely perceptible sly 
smile~. "Do you know what goes on top of the sub-flooring?" 
they asked. The aide looked blank. So they dismissed him 
politely. "Well, you really can't help us much, in that case." 
"What goes on top of the sub-flooring!" shouted the colonel., 
when informed what they had said. "Why, man, the floor, 
of course! Oh, well, if they feel like joking, I suppose I 
needn't worry. Things must be getting along all right." 
"Perhaps they are, perhaps they aren't," said the aide, 
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rather stiffly. "All I can say is I've never seen anyone build 
a road like that before." 
N ext day the colonel himself rode down to the site. It was 
nothing like any road-building job he had ever seen. The 
swamp showed no mark of pickaxe or spade. Indeed, what 
could axe or spade have done in that spongy morass? 
He began to wonder whether he had come to the right 
spot. Yes, it must be right. There, out of the forest, ap-
peared the stately figure of Makar Savelyich, walking toward 
him across the swamp. The colonel had an impulse to give a 
warning shout, but checked himself when he saw how con-
fidently the old man moved over the treacherous surface. 
Makar Savelyich was as lean as a wolf in early spring, and 
the colonel asked him anxiously: "Are you getting anything to 
eat out here?" 
"Two meals a day, and good hot food, too. What brings 
you along ahead of time, Colonel?" 
"Why, I just wanted to see if there was anything you 
wanted," the colonel answered, afraid of offending the old 
man, "and to have a look around." 
"You won't see anything here. The road is being laid 
through the forest. Look-there goes part of it now." 
Eight old men had come out of the forest, carrying a wooden 
raft suspended on ropes. They looked rather like pallbearers 
with a hearse. They lowered the raft to the ground, and were 
followed by eight more old men with a similar contraption. 
The rafts were laid end to end. Then two of the men began 
to lash them together with some kind of cloth. 
"Why, Makar Savelyich, they'll be sucked in by the swamp," 
the colonel said, distressed. "There are quagmires here you'd 
never get out of alive.'~ 
"Aye, aye, boy, so there are. Only not where we're laying 
the road. Just turn round and take a look over there, over 
the top of the grass, where it's longest. What can you see?" 
"Grass, .only green grass," the colonel replied, staring at the 
gently tossing surface. 
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"Have another look. Is it all green, or can you see a bit 
of yellow, as well?" 
The colonel strained his eyes until he saw, or thought he 
saw, a sort of thin, yellowish stripe treadding the lush green-
ery. 
"Yes, I see," he said. 
"Well, that yellow tells you it's "not real swamp. The tips 
of the grass are scorched by the sun. That means they get 
less moisture. Now real swamp grass is never like that. In 
a real swamp the sun never scorches the grass, no matter how 
hot it is, because the roots are resting in water below the 
surface. But here the roots are in firm ground, and there's 
less moisture. At first glance it looks like real swamp grass. 
But actually the soil is only damp near the surface, where the 
rain wets it. U:nderneath, its quite hard and dry. You can 
rest supports on it. Let's have a look at the planks." 
They moved toward the forest. In spite of the old man's 
reassurances, the colonel stepped along very gingerly, the 
ground beneath him swaying and bobbing as he moved. 
Five or six rafts were lying on the ground, and the colonel 
noticed that the road they formed had began to curve, fol-
lowing the direction of the yellow-tipped grass. 
The.Iogs were nailed together on a cross-beam, and the fin-
ished rafts were laid on thick, " transverse logs which held them 
clear of the ground. Makar Savelyich singled out a blade of 
grass with a dark brown tip from its hiding place between 
two sorry shoots of wild pea. Then he probed about in the 
soil for its root, and pulled it up. The root looked like a 
long, white worm. It was dry, and forked at the end. He 
held the root against one of the transverse logs. The thickness 
of the log and the lengtp of the root were the same. 
"Now, do you see? With these for sleepers, the road's as 
firm as a rock." 
"I understand," replied the colonel respectfully. 
"Aye, that's it," said the old man proudly. "Ev~rything 
in nature's topsy-turvy with' us." 
"Take cover!" A ringing boyish voice broke the silence. 
The shout came from above, as if from a tree. 
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"My little grandson," explained the old man. "He's our 
spotter/' A pulsating roar burst on them from over the for-
est, and a Henschel dived low over the trees, almost grazing 
their crests. Then it soared above the swamp. 
The old men had already thrown a net of green grass over 
the rafts. The bomb fell about 300 yards from where they 
stood. A green fountain of grass and water, shaped like a 
poplar, spurted up and fell in a shower of spray. 
"Restless devil, that one," observed Makar Savelyich. 
"Comes over every day. He seems to smell the rat, but he 
doesn't know quite where it is." 
The plane dropped another bomb and vanished behind the 
trees. Over the forest it released a third. A tree toppled 
over, splintered by the blast. A confused noise of shouts and 
curses followed. One of the old men ran out of the forest 
with a birch-bark pail, and hurried down to the river. 
"What's happened, Danilych?" 
The colonel and Makar Savelyich rushed into the forest. 
Near the stri(;;ken tree lay Grandpa Kondratenkov, his face 
dark and dour. His friends stood around him in a circle. 
"Almost knocked the wind out of me," Grandpa gasped. 
"I feel quite empty inside, and as light as a feather." 
"Eat a bit of the soil, and you'll feel heavier," Makar Sa-
velyich advised him. 
They turned Grandpa over on his stomach. He pressed his 
~outh to the dark moist ground, churned up by the explo~ 
Slon. 
"No good, boys," he groaned. "Makarushka, I didn't fasten 
the rope at the fifth lap. See you don't forget it. Keep a bit 
more to the right of the stream, when you get deeper into the 
forest. The ground's firmer. 
"Don't you worry about that, Grandpa," soothed lVlakar 
. Savelyich. 
"I know, I know, Makarushka," sighed the ancient. "But 
folk are so young, so spoiled .... " His voice was barely a 
whisper. Then he suddenly sat up. "I can't die with every-
thing in such a mess. Give me some water." 
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They gave him some cold water from the stream. After 
swallowing some of it with difficulty, noisily, he got up. He 
swayed. Then, leaning forward slightly, he steadied himself 
on his wide-spread bandy legs, planted so firmly on the 
ground that he looked as if he had taken root in it. 
"Hand over that brace, Danilych," he said, breathing heav-
ily. 
On the thirteenth day, when the sun was well up in the 
sky, the chairman of the village Soviet appeared at the col-
onel's dugout and reported, military fashion, that the job 
was done. That even~ng there was a meeting, at which the 
colonel expressed the gratitude of the Red Army units which, 
thanks to the labors of Lyubino Polye, were able to launch 
an offensive against the enemy. 
Next morning the first column of loaded trucks drove over 
the new road. The planks sighed heavily and sank to the 
level of the ground, squeezing moisture between the edges, 
and then settled down firmly, for all time. 
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NOTE 
These are examples of the big and little things that went 
on for forty-seven months in the rear of the Wehrmacht and 
in the rear of the Red Army. These big and litle things done 
by the people of the Soviet Union made it possible for the 
Soviet Army, Navy and Air Force to do the seemingly im-
possible. From Generalissimo Stalin who inspired, directed 
and sustained the titanic effort, down to the last woodsman 
and partisan-the Soviet people dearly bought Russia's share 
in our partnership of triumph. This brief and inadequate 
account is written lest that share and its price be forgotten 
and the Russian achievement obscured by the dazzling explo-
sions of atomic bombs which~ let us remember~ occurred when 
the war had already been won and which~ furthermore~ will 
never be able to take the place of the effort of valiant peoples 
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